Movement 08 of 08

Europe

Northern, Western, Southern, Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe, and European states outside the European Union

Europe is the analytical container, and it is not the European Union. Member states, the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, the Western Balkans, candidate states and smaller European states are all inside this movement, and EU membership is not the test of whether a European perspective matters.

Broad window
Fri 21 May, about 5:00 AM to 8:00 AM Toronto timeIn London: Fri 21 May, about 10:00 AM to 1:00 PM. The hours belong to the conversation, not to one region: contributors from anywhere take part wherever the question needs them.
Taking part
Contributor expressions of interest are not open.

The question in play

How must leadership change when the systems people depend on are changing faster than institutions can adapt?

The relay's opening question, carried from Toronto. Sub-Saharan Africa transforms it live, and this movement receives that version when its own begins.

Regional reality

Regional Reality

Europe enters a period of profound adjustment with extraordinary institutional, economic, scientific and social capability, but many of the systems that produced its stability and prosperity were built for conditions that are changing. Ageing populations, slower productivity growth, fragmented capital and services markets, high energy costs, technological competition, climate risk, migration, security pressures and geopolitical dependence are increasing the demands placed on institutions designed partly around predictability, integration and incremental change. Europe's leadership challenge is therefore not simply to preserve what works or dismantle what constrains it. It is to renew mature systems without destroying the trust, protections, cohesion and institutional capability that made them valuable in the first place.

Institutions → Adaptation → Renewal

What these three words mean here
Institutions
Far more than formal government bodies: democratic and EU institutions, national, regional and municipal government, regulatory systems, markets, welfare and education systems, research institutions, firms, financial and labour institutions, infrastructure systems, civil society, legal systems, cross-border institutions and multilateral structures. Institutional maturity does not guarantee institutional adaptability.
Adaptation
The hinge. The ability to change policy, regulation, investment, infrastructure, industrial and labour systems, migration and energy systems, security arrangements, technology governance, capital allocation, skills and institutional responsibilities, without unnecessarily destroying trust, rights, protections, cohesion, legitimacy or accumulated capability. The challenge is not choosing between institutions and change. It is making institutions capable of change.
Renewal
Not dismantling mature institutions, and not preserving them unchanged. Keeping what remains valuable while changing what no longer fits, through institutional redesign, infrastructure modernization, capital-market integration, industrial and energy transformation, workforce adaptation, technological and defence capability, regulatory simplification where it helps, better cross-border coordination, climate resilience, new forms of participation and institutional learning. Renewal is not preservation and it is not destruction. It is the disciplined adaptation of capability to new conditions.

Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

Institutional capability remains an asset only when institutions can adapt without destroying the trust, protections and cohesion that give them legitimacy.

The region's inquiry starts from institutions that work, and asks whether they can change fast enough for conditions that no longer match them. It is organised around:

  • Mature institutions that must become adaptive
  • Capability that exists and does not reach scale
  • A labour and social model meeting a different demographic structure
  • Systems that are European in law and fragmented in operation
  • What must be renewed first when everything demands investment

This is what LEAD48's research sees in Europe: the tensions, the evidence and the questions it raises. It is where the inquiry starts, not a boundary around it. The conversation needs people who can strengthen it, challenge it, complicate it or take it somewhere it has not gone, and a well-evidenced challenge to this reading is as strong a contribution as support for it.

Prevailing conditions Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

What is changing here?

Each condition is backed by the sources listed with it. Open a source to see what it says and where it stops.

Europe's economic capability is stronger than its ability to scale some forms of innovation

Research, science and invention are substantial. The systems between invention, commercialization and scale are where capability is lost.

Detail and scope

Research spending is 2.3 percent of GDP across the European Union, close to the world figure of 2.6, while output per person employed is $117,000 against $154,000 in the United States. Europe's innovation challenge is not simply invention. It also concerns the systems between invention, commercialization and scale: capital, procurement, market integration, regulation and the infrastructure a growing firm needs.

Scope: Continental, and uneven: research intensity ranges from 3.6 percent of GDP in Sweden to 0.5 in Romania, and productivity from $179,000 per worker in Norway to $57,000 in Serbia.

  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2023)

    Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

    Research and development spending in 2023 was 2.3 percent of GDP across the European Union, against a world figure of 2.6 percent. Sweden spent 3.6 percent, Germany and Switzerland 3.2, the United Kingdom 2.7, France 2.2, Norway 1.9, Poland 1.6, Spain and Greece 1.5, Italy 1.4, Serbia 0.9, Romania 0.5 and Ukraine 0.3 percent. Research intensity varies by a factor of ten across the continent.

    Published
    2023 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2023
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    Spending, not results. It measures what goes into research, not what comes out, and nothing here shows whether an invention is financed, commercialised or scaled afterwards, which is the question this evidence is being used to raise.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

    Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
    Limitations
    Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
View the other 5 conditions

The Single Market is simultaneously one of Europe's greatest achievements and an unfinished system

Goods move as one market. Services, capital, energy, telecommunications and digital systems do not, to the same degree.

Detail and scope

Legal integration does not automatically create complete operational integration. The framework is real and the operating reality is partial, which is neither a failure nor a completed project: it is an unfinished system whose remaining fragmentation is where firms meet their ceiling.

Scope: Felt most by services firms, by capital seeking scale, and by anything that has to cross a border as a regulated activity rather than as a box.

  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

    Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
    Limitations
    Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.

Europe's demographic model is colliding with its labour model

Ageing, participation, labour shortages, skills, migration, care and pensions are one problem that is usually handled as several.

Detail and scope

There are 34.6 people over 65 for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide, and recorded net migration in 2024 ran positive in some European states and negative in others in the same year. Demographic pressure becomes an institutional challenge when labour, skills, migration and social systems cannot adapt together.

Scope: Continental, with the age structure ranging from 38.8 in Italy to 28.2 in Ukraine, and with movement running in both directions across the continent.

  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

    In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    Net migration

    Recorded net migration in 2024 was positive for the European Union as a whole at about 195,000 people, with 417,000 for the United Kingdom, 112,000 for Spain, 95,000 for Italy, 91,000 for France, 50,000 for Sweden, 44,000 for Norway, 40,000 for Switzerland and 37,000 for Germany. Over the same year it was negative for Poland at about -238,000, Greece at about -123,000, Romania at about -28,000 and Serbia at about -8,000. Ukraine recorded about +1,146,000. Movement runs in both directions across the continent in the same year.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union
    Limitations
    A net figure, so arrivals and departures cancel each other out and neither is visible. It covers a single year, it includes returning nationals alongside new arrivals, and it carries no information about who moved, why, under what status or what happened after arrival.

Decarbonisation, affordability, industrial competitiveness and energy security have become one system problem

Electricity prices, industrial capability, grids, imports, emissions and security are treated as separate policy files and behave as a single system.

Detail and scope

Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union, ranging from 80.0 percent in Spain to -719.2 in Norway, which exports several times what it uses. Energy transition becomes durable when climate, affordability, industrial capability and security are designed as one system rather than competing policy files. Nothing here predetermines the technology mix.

Scope: Continental, and the starting positions differ so sharply that a single European answer is unlikely to fit every member of it.

  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

    Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

    Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

    Published
    2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2015
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.

Security is increasingly an economic, industrial and institutional question

What can be produced, financed, coordinated, protected and sustained matters as much as what can be purchased.

Detail and scope

Security increasingly depends on what societies can produce, finance, coordinate, protect and sustain, not only on what governments can purchase. Industrial capacity, supply chains, technology, infrastructure, energy, fiscal capacity, alliances and institutional coordination all sit inside it, and import dependence at 59.1 percent of energy use is a security fact as much as an economic one.

Scope: Continental, with exposure and capability distributed very differently between states, including states outside the European Union.

  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

    Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

    Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

    Published
    2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2015
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.

Europe's climate challenge has moved from mitigation alone toward resilience of existing systems

Heat, flooding and drought are already acting on infrastructure, agriculture, cities, water, insurance and public finance built for a different climate.

Detail and scope

Climate leadership increasingly requires protecting existing systems from conditions they were not designed to withstand, at the same time as reducing emissions. Adaptation is not secondary to mitigation here; it is the part that arrives on a schedule nobody chose.

Scope: Continental and unequal: southern and coastal Europe carry heat, drought and flood exposure first, and public finance and insurance carry the cost everywhere.

Inside the region Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

One region, several realities

None of these stands for the others.

  • Northern Europe

    Energy transition, welfare-state adaptation, technology and research intensity, ageing, security, Arctic change, industrial transition and migration. Nordic performance is not the European template and is not uniform in itself: Sweden spends 3.6 percent of GDP on research and Norway 1.9, and Norway, outside the European Union, exports several times the energy it uses while its neighbours import.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2023)

      Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

      Research and development spending in 2023 was 2.3 percent of GDP across the European Union, against a world figure of 2.6 percent. Sweden spent 3.6 percent, Germany and Switzerland 3.2, the United Kingdom 2.7, France 2.2, Norway 1.9, Poland 1.6, Spain and Greece 1.5, Italy 1.4, Serbia 0.9, Romania 0.5 and Ukraine 0.3 percent. Research intensity varies by a factor of ten across the continent.

      Published
      2023 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2023
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      Spending, not results. It measures what goes into research, not what comes out, and nothing here shows whether an invention is financed, commercialised or scaled afterwards, which is the question this evidence is being used to raise.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

      Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

      Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

      Published
      2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2015
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.
View the other 6
  • Western Europe

    Industrial capability, productivity, finance, migration, energy costs, social protection, regulation, technology, defence and infrastructure renewal. France and Germany are consequential and are not proxies: Germany's research intensity of 3.2 percent of GDP sits against France's 2.2, their energy import positions differ by seventeen points, and their productivity figures are within a few thousand dollars of Italy's.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2023)

      Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

      Research and development spending in 2023 was 2.3 percent of GDP across the European Union, against a world figure of 2.6 percent. Sweden spent 3.6 percent, Germany and Switzerland 3.2, the United Kingdom 2.7, France 2.2, Norway 1.9, Poland 1.6, Spain and Greece 1.5, Italy 1.4, Serbia 0.9, Romania 0.5 and Ukraine 0.3 percent. Research intensity varies by a factor of ten across the continent.

      Published
      2023 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2023
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      Spending, not results. It measures what goes into research, not what comes out, and nothing here shows whether an invention is financed, commercialised or scaled afterwards, which is the question this evidence is being used to raise.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

      Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

      Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

      Published
      2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2015
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

      Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
      Limitations
      Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
  • Southern Europe

    Demographic pressure, youth employment, migration flows in both directions, climate exposure, water stress, tourism dependence, energy import dependence above three quarters of use, productivity and regional inequality. It is not read here through debt or unemployment alone: Italy's output per worker is among Europe's highest while its old-age ratio is the continent's highest at 38.8, which is a different problem from the one usually described.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

      In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

      Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
      Limitations
      Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

      Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

      Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

      Published
      2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2015
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.
  • Central Europe

    Manufacturing and industrial supply chains, energy transition from a different starting mix, labour supply, European integration, security exposure, demographic change, infrastructure and technology transition. Poland's energy import dependence of 30.2 percent is half the European Union average and its recorded net migration in 2024 was negative, which describes a different set of adaptation problems from the continent's west.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

      Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

      Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

      Published
      2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2015
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Net migration

      Recorded net migration in 2024 was positive for the European Union as a whole at about 195,000 people, with 417,000 for the United Kingdom, 112,000 for Spain, 95,000 for Italy, 91,000 for France, 50,000 for Sweden, 44,000 for Norway, 40,000 for Switzerland and 37,000 for Germany. Over the same year it was negative for Poland at about -238,000, Greece at about -123,000, Romania at about -28,000 and Serbia at about -8,000. Ukraine recorded about +1,146,000. Movement runs in both directions across the continent in the same year.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union
      Limitations
      A net figure, so arrivals and departures cancel each other out and neither is visible. It covers a single year, it includes returning nationals alongside new arrivals, and it carries no information about who moved, why, under what status or what happened after arrival.
  • Eastern Europe

    Security, demographic pressure, energy, industrial transition, migration, infrastructure, institutional change, reconstruction and integration. It is not reduced to geopolitical conflict: Ukraine has the youngest recorded age structure in this group at 28.2 dependants per hundred, research intensity of 0.3 percent of GDP, and recorded net migration of about +1,146,000 in 2024, which are reconstruction, capability and institutional questions as much as security ones.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

      In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2023)

      Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

      Research and development spending in 2023 was 2.3 percent of GDP across the European Union, against a world figure of 2.6 percent. Sweden spent 3.6 percent, Germany and Switzerland 3.2, the United Kingdom 2.7, France 2.2, Norway 1.9, Poland 1.6, Spain and Greece 1.5, Italy 1.4, Serbia 0.9, Romania 0.5 and Ukraine 0.3 percent. Research intensity varies by a factor of ten across the continent.

      Published
      2023 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2023
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      Spending, not results. It measures what goes into research, not what comes out, and nothing here shows whether an invention is financed, commercialised or scaled afterwards, which is the question this evidence is being used to raise.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Net migration

      Recorded net migration in 2024 was positive for the European Union as a whole at about 195,000 people, with 417,000 for the United Kingdom, 112,000 for Spain, 95,000 for Italy, 91,000 for France, 50,000 for Sweden, 44,000 for Norway, 40,000 for Switzerland and 37,000 for Germany. Over the same year it was negative for Poland at about -238,000, Greece at about -123,000, Romania at about -28,000 and Serbia at about -8,000. Ukraine recorded about +1,146,000. Movement runs in both directions across the continent in the same year.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union
      Limitations
      A net figure, so arrivals and departures cancel each other out and neither is visible. It covers a single year, it includes returning nationals alongside new arrivals, and it carries no information about who moved, why, under what status or what happened after arrival.
  • Southeast Europe and the Balkans

    Infrastructure, energy, migration, institutional reform, investment, demographic change, accession and integration processes, and regional connectivity. Serbia's output per worker of $57,000 against the European Union's $117,000, with an old-age ratio of 36.0 already close to Germany's, is an ageing economy at a different income level, which is not the same adaptation problem as either.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

      Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
      Limitations
      Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

      In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.
  • European states outside the European Union

    The United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, the Western Balkans and candidate states, treated on their own terms. They are not a footnote to the Union: Switzerland and Norway record the highest output per worker in this movement at $157,000 and $179,000, the United Kingdom recorded Europe's largest positive net migration in 2024 at about 417,000, and Ukraine's institutional and reconstruction questions are European questions. EU membership is not the criterion for whether a European perspective matters.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

      Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
      Limitations
      Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Net migration

      Recorded net migration in 2024 was positive for the European Union as a whole at about 195,000 people, with 417,000 for the United Kingdom, 112,000 for Spain, 95,000 for Italy, 91,000 for France, 50,000 for Sweden, 44,000 for Norway, 40,000 for Switzerland and 37,000 for Germany. Over the same year it was negative for Poland at about -238,000, Greece at about -123,000, Romania at about -28,000 and Serbia at about -8,000. Ukraine recorded about +1,146,000. Movement runs in both directions across the continent in the same year.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union
      Limitations
      A net figure, so arrivals and departures cancel each other out and neither is visible. It covers a single year, it includes returning nationals alongside new arrivals, and it carries no information about who moved, why, under what status or what happened after arrival.

Who experiences the region differently Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

Who experiences this differently?

No region is a single story. These groups are named from the evidence, not as a complete list.

  • Older people, and the systems built around them

    Pensions, care and health systems were designed around a ratio that no longer holds: 34.6 people over 65 per hundred of working age across the Union, against 15.7 worldwide. The question is not whether these protections are legitimate. It is whether the systems delivering them can adapt without being dismantled.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

      In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.
View the other 4 groups
  • Younger generations

    They inherit both the protections and the deferred adaptation. Housing, entry into secure work, and the cost of systems designed before they were born fall on them, which makes intergenerational fairness a live institutional question rather than a rhetorical one.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

      In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.
  • Migrants, and the institutions that receive them

    Migration here is demographic, economic, institutional and political at once. Net migration ran positive in some European states and negative in others in the same year, and the questions that follow, about labour supply, skills, housing, services, integration, cohesion and identity, are not answered by border policy alone. Disagreement about this is real and is preserved rather than resolved.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Net migration

      Recorded net migration in 2024 was positive for the European Union as a whole at about 195,000 people, with 417,000 for the United Kingdom, 112,000 for Spain, 95,000 for Italy, 91,000 for France, 50,000 for Sweden, 44,000 for Norway, 40,000 for Switzerland and 37,000 for Germany. Over the same year it was negative for Poland at about -238,000, Greece at about -123,000, Romania at about -28,000 and Serbia at about -8,000. Ukraine recorded about +1,146,000. Movement runs in both directions across the continent in the same year.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union
      Limitations
      A net figure, so arrivals and departures cancel each other out and neither is visible. It covers a single year, it includes returning nationals alongside new arrivals, and it carries no information about who moved, why, under what status or what happened after arrival.
  • Researchers, founders and the firms that try to scale

    Capability exists: 2.3 percent of GDP goes into research. What is missing sits between invention and scale, in capital, procurement, fragmented markets and the regulatory surface a firm crosses when it grows beyond one country.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2023)

      Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

      Research and development spending in 2023 was 2.3 percent of GDP across the European Union, against a world figure of 2.6 percent. Sweden spent 3.6 percent, Germany and Switzerland 3.2, the United Kingdom 2.7, France 2.2, Norway 1.9, Poland 1.6, Spain and Greece 1.5, Italy 1.4, Serbia 0.9, Romania 0.5 and Ukraine 0.3 percent. Research intensity varies by a factor of ten across the continent.

      Published
      2023 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2023
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      Spending, not results. It measures what goes into research, not what comes out, and nothing here shows whether an invention is financed, commercialised or scaled afterwards, which is the question this evidence is being used to raise.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

      Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
      Limitations
      Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
  • Public servants and the people who run institutions

    Adaptation is asked of the people inside institutions designed for predictability, usually while they are also asked to keep delivering. They know where the constraint actually sits, which is rarely where it is assumed to be.

What the evidence complicates Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

What might we be getting wrong?

  • Common assumption

    Mature institutions are automatically adaptive.

    What the evidence shows

    Institutional capability can become rigid when systems optimized for stability struggle to respond to changing conditions. Maturity produces trust, protection and predictability, and the same design features slow the response when the conditions change.

View the other 7 assumptions
  • Common assumption

    Europe's competitiveness problem is primarily excessive regulation.

    What the evidence shows

    Productivity and competitiveness also depend on capital, energy, market integration, infrastructure, skills, technology, investment and scale. Output per worker is $117,000 in the Union against $154,000 in the United States, and research spending is close to the world average, which points at the systems between invention and scale rather than at rule volume alone.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

      Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
      Limitations
      Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2023)

      Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

      Research and development spending in 2023 was 2.3 percent of GDP across the European Union, against a world figure of 2.6 percent. Sweden spent 3.6 percent, Germany and Switzerland 3.2, the United Kingdom 2.7, France 2.2, Norway 1.9, Poland 1.6, Spain and Greece 1.5, Italy 1.4, Serbia 0.9, Romania 0.5 and Ukraine 0.3 percent. Research intensity varies by a factor of ten across the continent.

      Published
      2023 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2023
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      Spending, not results. It measures what goes into research, not what comes out, and nothing here shows whether an invention is financed, commercialised or scaled afterwards, which is the question this evidence is being used to raise.
  • Common assumption

    The Single Market means Europe already operates as one market.

    What the evidence shows

    Legal integration can coexist with operational fragmentation across services, capital, energy, telecommunications and other systems. The legal architecture existing is not the same as the market working, and firms meet the difference when they try to grow across borders.

  • Common assumption

    Migration is primarily a border-management problem.

    What the evidence shows

    Migration also intersects with demographics, labour supply, skills, productivity, integration, public services and social cohesion. In 2024 some European states recorded net inflows and others net outflows, which is a set of institutional questions rather than a single frontier.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Net migration

      Recorded net migration in 2024 was positive for the European Union as a whole at about 195,000 people, with 417,000 for the United Kingdom, 112,000 for Spain, 95,000 for Italy, 91,000 for France, 50,000 for Sweden, 44,000 for Norway, 40,000 for Switzerland and 37,000 for Germany. Over the same year it was negative for Poland at about -238,000, Greece at about -123,000, Romania at about -28,000 and Serbia at about -8,000. Ukraine recorded about +1,146,000. Movement runs in both directions across the continent in the same year.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union
      Limitations
      A net figure, so arrivals and departures cancel each other out and neither is visible. It covers a single year, it includes returning nationals alongside new arrivals, and it carries no information about who moved, why, under what status or what happened after arrival.
  • Common assumption

    Climate leadership is primarily about reducing emissions.

    What the evidence shows

    A warming Europe must simultaneously mitigate, adapt and protect infrastructure, communities and productive systems from impacts that are already arriving. Adaptation is not the second half of the climate agenda here; it is the half that is already overdue.

  • Common assumption

    Strategic autonomy means reducing interdependence.

    What the evidence shows

    Resilience may require diversifying, redesigning or governing interdependence rather than attempting self-sufficiency. Energy import dependence of 59.1 percent of use across the Union, alongside a European exporter at -719.2 percent, describes a continent whose security question is how dependence is structured, not whether it exists.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

      Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

      Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

      Published
      2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2015
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.
  • Common assumption

    Europe's innovation gap is primarily an invention gap.

    What the evidence shows

    Capability can exist while financing, commercialization, procurement and market fragmentation constrain scale. Research intensity close to the world average alongside a persistent productivity gap points to what happens after the invention, not to whether it happens.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2023)

      Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

      Research and development spending in 2023 was 2.3 percent of GDP across the European Union, against a world figure of 2.6 percent. Sweden spent 3.6 percent, Germany and Switzerland 3.2, the United Kingdom 2.7, France 2.2, Norway 1.9, Poland 1.6, Spain and Greece 1.5, Italy 1.4, Serbia 0.9, Romania 0.5 and Ukraine 0.3 percent. Research intensity varies by a factor of ten across the continent.

      Published
      2023 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2023
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      Spending, not results. It measures what goes into research, not what comes out, and nothing here shows whether an invention is financed, commercialised or scaled afterwards, which is the question this evidence is being used to raise.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

      Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
      Limitations
      Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
  • Common assumption

    Protecting established systems protects future prosperity.

    What the evidence shows

    Systems designed to preserve existing value can weaken future capability when adaptation is delayed too long. The protection is real and so is the cost of deferring the change, and the second is paid by people who were not part of the decision.

Leadership challenges Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

What must leaders do?

The conversations this region will prioritise. Not a ranking of the region's biggest problems.

  1. Make Mature Institutions Adaptive

    How can institutions designed for stability become capable of faster adaptation without sacrificing legitimacy, trust and protection?

    The anchor priority, and the one the others are cases of. The question is not whether the institutions are valuable but whether they can change at the speed the conditions now require.

    4P: Process, People, PortfolioSDGs: 16, 8, 17

    Rests on: The Single Market is simultaneously one of Europe's greatest achievements and an unfinished system; Europe's demographic model is colliding with its labour model

View the other 4 priorities
  1. Convert Innovation into Scale

    What must change between research, invention, investment and commercialization so that more European capability reaches productive scale?

    Research, capital, firms, markets, procurement, regulation, infrastructure and talent all sit between an invention and a company large enough to matter.

    4P: Process, PortfolioSDGs: 9, 8, 17

    Rests on: Europe's economic capability is stronger than its ability to scale some forms of innovation; The Single Market is simultaneously one of Europe's greatest achievements and an unfinished system

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2023)

      Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

      Research and development spending in 2023 was 2.3 percent of GDP across the European Union, against a world figure of 2.6 percent. Sweden spent 3.6 percent, Germany and Switzerland 3.2, the United Kingdom 2.7, France 2.2, Norway 1.9, Poland 1.6, Spain and Greece 1.5, Italy 1.4, Serbia 0.9, Romania 0.5 and Ukraine 0.3 percent. Research intensity varies by a factor of ten across the continent.

      Published
      2023 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2023
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      Spending, not results. It measures what goes into research, not what comes out, and nothing here shows whether an invention is financed, commercialised or scaled afterwards, which is the question this evidence is being used to raise.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

      Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
      Limitations
      Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
  2. Adapt the Labour and Social Model to Demographic Reality

    How can Europe sustain productivity, participation and social protection as its demographic structure changes?

    Ageing, migration, skills, mobility, automation, care, pensions, participation and productivity are one adaptation problem, usually attempted as several separate ones.

    4P: People, ProcessSDGs: 8, 10, 3

    Rests on: Europe's demographic model is colliding with its labour model

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

      In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.
    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Net migration

      Recorded net migration in 2024 was positive for the European Union as a whole at about 195,000 people, with 417,000 for the United Kingdom, 112,000 for Spain, 95,000 for Italy, 91,000 for France, 50,000 for Sweden, 44,000 for Norway, 40,000 for Switzerland and 37,000 for Germany. Over the same year it was negative for Poland at about -238,000, Greece at about -123,000, Romania at about -28,000 and Serbia at about -8,000. Ukraine recorded about +1,146,000. Movement runs in both directions across the continent in the same year.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union
      Limitations
      A net figure, so arrivals and departures cancel each other out and neither is visible. It covers a single year, it includes returning nationals alongside new arrivals, and it carries no information about who moved, why, under what status or what happened after arrival.
  3. Integrate Systems That Are European in Law but Fragmented in Operation

    Where does Europe possess common frameworks without sufficiently interoperable systems?

    Energy, capital, services, defence, telecommunications, digital infrastructure, labour and transport each have a European framework and a national operating reality.

    4P: Process, PortfolioSDGs: 9, 17, 11

    Rests on: The Single Market is simultaneously one of Europe's greatest achievements and an unfinished system; Decarbonisation, affordability, industrial competitiveness and energy security have become one system problem

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

      Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
      Limitations
      Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
  4. Choose What Must Be Renewed First

    When defence, climate adaptation, energy, digital infrastructure, industry, ageing and social systems all demand investment, how should leaders decide what must change first and what cannot be allowed to fail?

    The portfolio question in its most direct form, and the one that connects every other priority to a budget and a sequence.

    4P: Portfolio, PlanetSDGs: 13, 16, 11

    Rests on: Security is increasingly an economic, industrial and institutional question; Europe's climate challenge has moved from mitigation alone toward resilience of existing systems; Decarbonisation, affordability, industrial competitiveness and energy security have become one system problem

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

      Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

      Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

      Published
      2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2015
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.

Tensions Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

What trade-offs must they navigate?

These are to investigate, not to resolve on a slide. Each side of a tension is a legitimate demand.

  • Protection and adaptation

    The protections are what people trust; changing the systems that deliver them is what the conditions now require, and the two are asked of the same institutions.

    Protecting rights, livelihoods and cohesion is legitimate and is much of what these institutions are for. So is adapting them before the protection becomes unaffordable or irrelevant.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

      In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.
View the other 4 tensions
  • National control and European scale

    Scale in capital, energy, defence and services requires common systems; each common system is a decision a member state no longer takes alone.

    Democratic accountability sits at national level and that is not a technicality. So is the fact that some capabilities only exist at continental scale.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

      Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
      Limitations
      Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
  • Stability and speed

    Deliberation, consultation and legal certainty are how European decisions earn legitimacy, and they are also what makes them slow.

    Due process is not an obstacle to good decisions, it is part of them. And a decision that arrives after the conditions have changed is a different decision.

  • Interdependence and strategic autonomy

    Interdependence delivered prosperity and created exposure. Autonomy reduces exposure and costs efficiency, capability and partners.

    Open interdependence is what Europe's economy is built on. So is the ability to act when a dependence is used against you.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

      Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

      Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

      Published
      2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2015
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.
  • Present protection and future investment

    Pensions, healthcare, subsidy and existing industry claim the same fiscal space as defence, grids, adaptation and digital infrastructure.

    Commitments already made to people are obligations, not line items. So is the investment that decides whether those commitments can be met in twenty years.

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

      In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.

Regional responses and experiments

What is being tried

Every response is classified as established, promising, early, contested, failed, and documented with the Response Case Protocol: Attempt → Conditions → Mechanism → Evidence → Outcome → For whom → Cost / trade-off → Unintended effects → Transferability.

Deepening the Single Market Established achievement / unfinished in services and capital
Attempt
Make goods, services, capital, labour and digital activity move across member states as they would inside one economy.
Conditions
Twenty-seven national regulatory systems, professional regimes, insolvency laws and supervisory practices, over a shared legal framework.
Mechanism
Common rules, mutual recognition and directives implemented nationally, which is what makes the framework adoptable and what leaves the operating layer national.
Evidence
Output per person employed is $117,000 across the Union against $154,000 in the United States, and $157,000 and $179,000 in non-member Switzerland and Norway.
Outcome
An established achievement that is unfinished where it matters most for scale. Goods integration is real; services, capital and digital integration are partial, and the gap is one plausible part of the productivity difference rather than a demonstrated cause. Neither a failure nor a completed project.
For whom
Firms large enough to absorb twenty-seven compliance surfaces benefit most; the firms the reform is aimed at are the ones that cannot.
Cost / trade-off
Deeper integration requires member states to give up regulatory discretion that is itself democratically held.
Unintended effects
Not established from this source, which shows a productivity gap rather than its composition.
Transferability
The distinction transfers: legal integration and operational integration are separate projects, and the second is slower.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

    Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
    Limitations
    Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
Capital-market integration and scale-up finance Long-running ambition / limited delivery
Attempt
Build a continental capital market so that European companies can raise growth finance at the scale their competitors can.
Conditions
Research spending of 2.3 percent of GDP producing inventions, against fragmented national capital markets, pension pools and insolvency regimes.
Mechanism
Successive union and savings-and-investment initiatives, each requiring national financial systems to converge.
Outcome
A long-running ambition with limited delivery. The capability side is evidenced, the finance side is not fixed, and firms that reach the scale-up stage still frequently raise abroad. This is the clearest case of the region's mechanism: institutional capability that exists, and an institutional system that cannot yet carry it to scale.
For whom
Growing firms and the savers whose capital is currently intermediated nationally.
Cost / trade-off
Integration requires harmonising supervision and insolvency, which touches national legal traditions rather than market plumbing alone.
Unintended effects
Not established in this cycle.
Transferability
High as a diagnosis, and specific in its solution.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2023)

    Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

    Research and development spending in 2023 was 2.3 percent of GDP across the European Union, against a world figure of 2.6 percent. Sweden spent 3.6 percent, Germany and Switzerland 3.2, the United Kingdom 2.7, France 2.2, Norway 1.9, Poland 1.6, Spain and Greece 1.5, Italy 1.4, Serbia 0.9, Romania 0.5 and Ukraine 0.3 percent. Research intensity varies by a factor of ten across the continent.

    Published
    2023 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2023
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    Spending, not results. It measures what goes into research, not what comes out, and nothing here shows whether an invention is financed, commercialised or scaled afterwards, which is the question this evidence is being used to raise.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

    Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
    Limitations
    Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
Explore all cases (8 more)
Industrial decarbonisation and the clean industrial agenda Early implementation / contested trade-offs
Attempt
Decarbonise heavy industry while keeping it in Europe, through investment support, energy cost measures and lead-market policy.
Conditions
Net energy imports of 59.1 percent of use, high industrial electricity costs relative to competitors, and emissions targets that bind on the same industries.
Mechanism
Public investment, state-aid flexibility, market design and procurement, attempting to change the cost position rather than the target.
Outcome
Early implementation, with the trade-offs contested rather than resolved. Climate, affordability, industrial capability and security are being handled as one system in the design and as separate files in the politics, which is the condition this case is testing.
For whom
Energy-intensive industry and its workforces, and households who pay for parts of the same system.
Cost / trade-off
Support that keeps industry in Europe costs fiscal space that defence, adaptation and social systems are also claiming.
Unintended effects
Not established in this cycle.
Transferability
The systems framing transfers; the specific instruments depend on fiscal room Europe is unusual in having.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

    Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

    Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

    Published
    2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2015
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.
European energy-system integration Demonstrated crisis response / incomplete integration
Attempt
Connect national energy systems well enough that supply, price and security are managed continentally rather than nationally.
Conditions
Import dependence ranging from 80.0 percent of use in Spain to a net exporter position in Norway, with national grids, storage and market arrangements built separately.
Mechanism
Interconnection, joint purchasing, storage coordination and market coupling, layered onto national systems.
Evidence
Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the Union in 2015, against -719.2 percent for Norway and 16.8 percent for Romania, and the series stops before the post-2022 changes in sourcing.
Outcome
Demonstrated crisis response with incomplete integration. Europe rerouted supply faster than most expected, which is evidence that the institutions can adapt under pressure, and the underlying system remains partly national. The unanswered question is whether adaptation under emergency becomes durable design.
For whom
Every household and firm exposed to price, and the member states whose position differs most from the average.
Cost / trade-off
Integration shares risk and requires accepting a neighbour's choices about the mix.
Unintended effects
Not established here; the verified series predates the changes being discussed.
Transferability
High, with the caveat that crisis response and system design are not the same capability.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

    Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

    Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

    Published
    2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2015
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.
European defence industrial and readiness initiatives Rapid political movement / early industrial delivery
Attempt
Rebuild the capacity to produce, sustain and coordinate defence capability at European scale rather than purchase it piecemeal.
Conditions
Decades of industrial consolidation and fragmented national procurement, meeting a security environment that changed faster than the industrial base could.
Mechanism
Joint procurement, production capacity support, stockpile targets and industrial strategy, across national armed forces and national industries.
Outcome
Rapid political movement with early industrial delivery. It belongs here as an institutional case rather than a military one: what is being tested is whether twenty-seven procurement systems and their industries can be coordinated quickly enough to matter, which is the adaptation question in its hardest form.
For whom
Member states, the industrial base and the workforces in it.
Cost / trade-off
Defence investment competes directly with climate adaptation, energy and social systems for the same fiscal space, which is P5 in practice.
Unintended effects
Not established in this cycle.
Transferability
The coordination lesson transfers more than the content.
Migration and labour-market integration Contested / uneven institutional capacity
Attempt
Manage arrival, status, housing, services and entry into work, in systems where demographic need and political consent point in different directions.
Conditions
34.6 people over 65 per hundred of working age, labour shortages in care, construction and services, and recorded net migration running positive in some European states and negative in others in the same year.
Mechanism
National asylum, residence and labour-market systems, under partly common European rules, with integration delivered municipally.
Evidence
In 2024 recorded net migration was about +195,000 for the European Union, +417,000 for the United Kingdom, -238,000 for Poland and -123,000 for Greece, with about +1,146,000 recorded for Ukraine.
Outcome
Contested, with uneven institutional capacity, and the disagreement is preserved rather than resolved here. What the evidence does show is that this is not one directional flow and not only a border question: demographic need, labour supply, municipal capacity, housing, services, integration and cohesion are all in it at once.
For whom
Migrants themselves, the municipalities that receive them, and the sectors whose labour supply depends on the outcome.
Cost / trade-off
The demographic and labour case and the social consent for it are both real, and they are not resolved by asserting either one.
Unintended effects
Not established from a net annual figure, which hides both flows and says nothing about what followed arrival.
Transferability
Low as policy, high as a warning: a single-lens migration system produces the institutional failures the other lenses predicted.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    Net migration

    Recorded net migration in 2024 was positive for the European Union as a whole at about 195,000 people, with 417,000 for the United Kingdom, 112,000 for Spain, 95,000 for Italy, 91,000 for France, 50,000 for Sweden, 44,000 for Norway, 40,000 for Switzerland and 37,000 for Germany. Over the same year it was negative for Poland at about -238,000, Greece at about -123,000, Romania at about -28,000 and Serbia at about -8,000. Ukraine recorded about +1,146,000. Movement runs in both directions across the continent in the same year.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union
    Limitations
    A net figure, so arrivals and departures cancel each other out and neither is visible. It covers a single year, it includes returning nationals alongside new arrivals, and it carries no information about who moved, why, under what status or what happened after arrival.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

    In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.
European AI governance and technological capability Established governance / contested capability position
Attempt
Govern artificial intelligence to a standard Europe considers legitimate, while building the compute, data, capital and adoption to have a capability worth governing.
Conditions
Research intensity of 2.3 percent of GDP, a productivity gap with the United States, fragmented capital markets and limited domestic compute.
Mechanism
Regulation setting terms of use and risk, alongside investment and infrastructure programmes intended to build the capability.
Outcome
Established governance with a contested capability position. The framing this movement refuses is that governance and capability trade off automatically: that is the claim to be tested, not the premise. The real question is whether Europe can build technological capability while preserving the protections it considers legitimate, and the answer is not yet in evidence either way.
For whom
Citizens protected by the rules, and the firms that have to build and adopt within them.
Cost / trade-off
Rules written before the capability exists shape a market Europe may not yet be a significant producer in.
Unintended effects
Not established in this cycle.
Transferability
High as a question, and the answer will be specific to institutional context.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2023)

    Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

    Research and development spending in 2023 was 2.3 percent of GDP across the European Union, against a world figure of 2.6 percent. Sweden spent 3.6 percent, Germany and Switzerland 3.2, the United Kingdom 2.7, France 2.2, Norway 1.9, Poland 1.6, Spain and Greece 1.5, Italy 1.4, Serbia 0.9, Romania 0.5 and Ukraine 0.3 percent. Research intensity varies by a factor of ten across the continent.

    Published
    2023 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2023
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    Spending, not results. It measures what goes into research, not what comes out, and nothing here shows whether an invention is financed, commercialised or scaled afterwards, which is the question this evidence is being used to raise.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

    Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
    Limitations
    Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
Climate adaptation and infrastructure resilience Recognised necessity / underfunded relative to exposure
Attempt
Protect infrastructure, cities, agriculture, water systems and communities against heat, flood and drought that existing systems were not designed for.
Conditions
Infrastructure, insurance, agriculture and public finance built around a climate that is no longer the one arriving.
Mechanism
National and municipal adaptation planning, infrastructure investment, insurance and risk-transfer arrangements, and water allocation.
Outcome
A recognised necessity that is underfunded relative to exposure. Adaptation is treated here as equal to mitigation rather than secondary to it, because the losses are already being taken, and the institutions carrying them, insurers, municipalities and public finance, are the ones in this movement.
For whom
Southern and coastal Europe first, and public finance everywhere.
Cost / trade-off
Adaptation spending is unglamorous, local and competes with the same budget as everything else in P5.
Unintended effects
Not established in this cycle.
Transferability
High: every region in this relay is discovering the same reclassification of adaptation.
Ukraine reconstruction and European integration Early implementation / institutional integration in progress
Attempt
Rebuild physical and institutional systems while simultaneously running an accession process, rather than sequencing one after the other.
Conditions
Destroyed infrastructure, displaced and returning populations, research intensity of 0.3 percent of GDP, and an institutional reform agenda running at the same time as reconstruction.
Mechanism
Reconstruction finance, institutional reform and accession conditionality, attempted concurrently.
Evidence
Recorded net migration for Ukraine in 2024 was about +1,146,000, and research and development spending was 0.3 percent of GDP in 2023.
Outcome
Early implementation, with institutional integration in progress. It is held here as a European institutional case and not only a security one: reconstruction, human capital, institutional reform and integration are the substance, and treating the country as a security file alone would miss the leadership question entirely.
For whom
Ukrainians rebuilding and returning, and the European institutions whose processes were not designed for this.
Cost / trade-off
Reconstruction and accession each assume the other is stable, and neither is.
Unintended effects
Not established from the material reviewed.
Transferability
The concurrency question transfers: reform and rebuilding are usually sequenced and here cannot be.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    Net migration

    Recorded net migration in 2024 was positive for the European Union as a whole at about 195,000 people, with 417,000 for the United Kingdom, 112,000 for Spain, 95,000 for Italy, 91,000 for France, 50,000 for Sweden, 44,000 for Norway, 40,000 for Switzerland and 37,000 for Germany. Over the same year it was negative for Poland at about -238,000, Greece at about -123,000, Romania at about -28,000 and Serbia at about -8,000. Ukraine recorded about +1,146,000. Movement runs in both directions across the continent in the same year.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union
    Limitations
    A net figure, so arrivals and departures cancel each other out and neither is visible. It covers a single year, it includes returning nationals alongside new arrivals, and it carries no information about who moved, why, under what status or what happened after arrival.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2023)

    Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

    Research and development spending in 2023 was 2.3 percent of GDP across the European Union, against a world figure of 2.6 percent. Sweden spent 3.6 percent, Germany and Switzerland 3.2, the United Kingdom 2.7, France 2.2, Norway 1.9, Poland 1.6, Spain and Greece 1.5, Italy 1.4, Serbia 0.9, Romania 0.5 and Ukraine 0.3 percent. Research intensity varies by a factor of ten across the continent.

    Published
    2023 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2023
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    Spending, not results. It measures what goes into research, not what comes out, and nothing here shows whether an invention is financed, commercialised or scaled afterwards, which is the question this evidence is being used to raise.
Enlargement and Western Balkans institutional integration Long-running process / contested pace and credibility
Attempt
Bring candidate states into European institutional systems, and prepare those institutions to absorb them.
Conditions
Serbia's output per worker at $57,000 against the Union's $117,000, with an old-age ratio of 36.0 already near Germany's, and decades of process without conclusion.
Mechanism
Accession chapters, conditionality and institutional alignment, on both sides of the process.
Evidence
Output per person employed in Serbia was $57,000 in 2024 against $117,000 across the European Union, with 36.0 people over 65 per hundred of working age against the Union's 34.6.
Outcome
A long-running process whose pace and credibility are contested on both sides. The institutional question runs in both directions: candidates are asked to adapt, and the Union's own decision-making and budgets would have to adapt to absorb them. An ageing candidate economy at half the Union's productivity is a different accession problem from the ones the process was designed around.
For whom
Candidate populations, and the member states whose institutions would change to accommodate them.
Cost / trade-off
Slower enlargement protects institutional function and costs credibility, capability and regional stability.
Unintended effects
Not established in this cycle.
Transferability
The reciprocity lesson transfers: integration changes the system doing the integrating.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

    Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
    Limitations
    Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

    In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.

Leadership interpretation

Through the LEAD48 4P Leadership Lens

The region remains the subject. The 4Ps help interpret what the evidence means for leadership.

What the evidence asks us to examine

People sustain and challenge institutions. Process determines whether they can adapt. Planet changes the conditions they must withstand. Portfolio determines what Europe protects, transforms, builds and stops. Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme
How each P reads in this region

People

Who carries the consequences?

Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

The evidence asks Who sustains these institutions, and who is asking them to change?

People sustain and challenge institutions. Workers, migrants, entrepreneurs, researchers, citizens, public servants, communities, younger generations, ageing populations and leaders both hold these systems up and press on them. With 34.6 people over 65 per hundred of working age and migration running in both directions across the continent in the same year, the demands on institutions come from the people who depend on them, which is what makes adaptation a question of trust rather than only of design.

  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

    In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    Net migration

    Recorded net migration in 2024 was positive for the European Union as a whole at about 195,000 people, with 417,000 for the United Kingdom, 112,000 for Spain, 95,000 for Italy, 91,000 for France, 50,000 for Sweden, 44,000 for Norway, 40,000 for Switzerland and 37,000 for Germany. Over the same year it was negative for Poland at about -238,000, Greece at about -123,000, Romania at about -28,000 and Serbia at about -8,000. Ukraine recorded about +1,146,000. Movement runs in both directions across the continent in the same year.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union
    Limitations
    A net figure, so arrivals and departures cancel each other out and neither is visible. It covers a single year, it includes returning nationals alongside new arrivals, and it carries no information about who moved, why, under what status or what happened after arrival.

Process

What systems shape the outcome?

Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

The evidence asks What decides whether an institution can actually change?

Process determines whether they can adapt. Regulation, permitting, capital allocation, cross-border coordination, procurement, migration systems, labour mobility, infrastructure delivery, energy markets and institutional decision-making are where adaptation either happens or stalls. This is also where legal integration and operational integration come apart: a framework that exists on paper and a system that works across a border are different achievements.

  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

    Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
    Limitations
    Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.

Planet

What must endure?

Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

The evidence asks What conditions must these institutions now withstand?

Planet changes the conditions they must withstand. Climate, water, energy, land, agriculture, ecosystems, heat, flooding and resource dependence set what infrastructure, cities, farms and industry have to cope with, and they are arriving faster than the systems were designed for. Energy import dependence of 59.1 percent of use across the Union, alongside a European exporter, shows that the physical position also differs sharply inside the continent.

  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

    Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

    Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

    Published
    2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2015
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.

Portfolio

What must leaders choose?

Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

The evidence asks What does Europe protect, transform, build and stop?

Portfolio determines what Europe protects, transforms, builds and stops, and it is the dominant P for this region. Defence, energy, grids, AI, digital infrastructure, transport, climate adaptation, housing, skills, industrial capacity, research and social systems all have a claim, and all of them are defensible. The distinctive part of the European version is that stopping something is as consequential as starting it, because what is stopped is usually something people were promised.

  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

    Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

    Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

    Published
    2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2015
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.
  • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

    Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

    In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

    Published
    2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
    Limitations
    An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.

How the 4P Leadership Lens works

SDG connections Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

Which Goals does this touch?

A Goal appears here only when a cited source supports the link.

  • SDG 7
    Affordable and clean energy Primary

    7.b: Expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services

    Affordability, security, decarbonisation and industrial capability are one system here. Evidence-backed

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

      Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

      Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

      Published
      2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2015
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.
  • SDG 8
    Decent work and economic growth Primary

    8.2: Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation

    The productivity gap and the systems between invention and scale are the same question. Evidence-backed

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

      Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
      Limitations
      Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
  • SDG 9
    Industry, innovation and infrastructure Primary

    9.5: Enhance scientific research and upgrade the technological capabilities of industrial sectors

    Research capability exists; industrial and technological scale is what the systems around it decide. Evidence-backed

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2023)

      Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

      Research and development spending in 2023 was 2.3 percent of GDP across the European Union, against a world figure of 2.6 percent. Sweden spent 3.6 percent, Germany and Switzerland 3.2, the United Kingdom 2.7, France 2.2, Norway 1.9, Poland 1.6, Spain and Greece 1.5, Italy 1.4, Serbia 0.9, Romania 0.5 and Ukraine 0.3 percent. Research intensity varies by a factor of ten across the continent.

      Published
      2023 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2023
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      Spending, not results. It measures what goes into research, not what comes out, and nothing here shows whether an invention is financed, commercialised or scaled afterwards, which is the question this evidence is being used to raise.
  • SDG 10
    Reduced inequalities Primary

    10.7: Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people

    Migration is demographic, economic and institutional here, and the regional inequalities inside Europe are part of the same question. Evidence-backed

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Net migration

      Recorded net migration in 2024 was positive for the European Union as a whole at about 195,000 people, with 417,000 for the United Kingdom, 112,000 for Spain, 95,000 for Italy, 91,000 for France, 50,000 for Sweden, 44,000 for Norway, 40,000 for Switzerland and 37,000 for Germany. Over the same year it was negative for Poland at about -238,000, Greece at about -123,000, Romania at about -28,000 and Serbia at about -8,000. Ukraine recorded about +1,146,000. Movement runs in both directions across the continent in the same year.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union
      Limitations
      A net figure, so arrivals and departures cancel each other out and neither is visible. It covers a single year, it includes returning nationals alongside new arrivals, and it carries no information about who moved, why, under what status or what happened after arrival.
  • SDG 11
    Sustainable cities and communities Primary

    11.b: Increase the number of cities adopting integrated policies towards resilience and adaptation to climate change

    Adaptation is delivered municipally, and cities carry the exposure first. Evidence-backed

  • SDG 13
    Climate action Primary

    13.1: Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters

    Mitigation and adaptation are treated as equal halves of the climate question in this movement. Evidence-backed

  • SDG 16
    Peace, justice and strong institutions Primary

    16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels

    Institutional adaptability is this movement's central subject. Evidence-backed

  • SDG 17
    Partnerships for the goals Primary

    17.14: Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development

    Coherence between member states and between European frameworks and national systems is where adaptation succeeds or stalls. Evidence-backed

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

      Output per person employed in 2024 was $117,000 across the European Union, against $154,000 in the United States, $179,000 in Norway and $157,000 in Switzerland, neither of which is an EU member. Inside Europe the range runs from $130,000 in Italy, $127,000 in France and Sweden and $124,000 in Germany to $99,000 in Romania, $93,000 in Poland, $92,000 in Greece and $57,000 in Serbia. The world figure is $50,000.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world
      Limitations
      Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.
View the 5 supporting Goals
  • SDG 3
    Good health and well-being Supporting

    3.8: Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection

    Health and care systems carry the demographic pressure first and most visibly. Evidence-backed

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

      In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.
  • SDG 4
    Quality education Supporting

    4.4: Substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship

    Skills systems are one of the instruments through which the labour model adapts. Evidence-backed

  • SDG 5
    Gender equality Supporting

    5.4: Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through public services, infrastructure and social protection policies

    Care demand rises with ageing, and who carries it decides who can participate. Evidence-backed

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2024)

      Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

      In 2024 there were 34.6 people aged 65 and over for every 100 of working age across the European Union, against 15.7 worldwide. Italy stood at 38.8, Greece 38.1, Germany 36.9, France 36.1, Serbia 36.0, Sweden 33.3, Spain 32.1, Romania 31.1, Poland 31.0, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 30.8, Norway 28.9 and Ukraine 28.2. Europe's age structure is more than twice the world's, and it is not uniform across the continent.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.
  • SDG 6
    Clean water and sanitation Supporting

    6.4: Substantially increase water-use efficiency and address water scarcity

    Drought and water allocation are now live questions in southern and central Europe. Evidence-backed

  • SDG 12
    Responsible consumption and production Supporting

    12.2: Achieve the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources

    Resource dependence and industrial transformation meet in the same decisions. Evidence-backed

    • Source World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015)

      Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

      Net energy imports were 59.1 percent of energy use across the European Union in 2015, against a world figure of -0.9 percent. Spain stood at 80.0 percent, Italy 79.6, Greece 79.1, Germany 64.4, Switzerland 56.4, France 47.6, the United Kingdom 40.3, Sweden 32.9, Ukraine 32.3, Poland 30.2, Serbia 27.8 and Romania 16.8. Norway was at -719.2 percent, exporting several times the energy it used. Europe contains both the world's most import-dependent economies and one of its largest exporters.

      Published
      2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20)
      Evidence period
      2015
      Geography
      European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world
      Limitations
      The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.
Why these Goals, and why these are primary

Primary Goals carry the region's inquiry; supporting Goals are touched by it. They are not equally weighted, and this movement carries eight primary Goals rather than six: the architecture is not forced into symmetry with earlier regions.

The movement

What this movement asks

Theme Institutions, adaptation, renewal

Broad window Fri 21 May, about 5:00 AM to 8:00 AM Toronto time. In London: Fri 21 May, about 10:00 AM to 1:00 PM.

Inquiry themes this movement feeds When capability exists but never reaches the outcome · Fund, sequence, defer or stop: when every choice is defensible · Adapting faster without spending the trust you will need later. Where you live does not decide where you fit.

LEAD48 curates the conversations inside this movement from the research on this page and the perspectives below. You do not need to choose a session: bring what you know to the inquiry, and the matching is LEAD48's work.

Contributor expressions of interest are not open.

The shape of a movement

How a movement moves

The same beats in every region, in the same order. What fills them, and how long they take, is this region's own.

View the beats every movement runs through
  1. Baton Handover In

    The incoming and outgoing regions are both live. Intellectual content, not an emcee transition.

  2. Opening Regional Provocation

    One strong regional voice frames the movement: what is happening in this region right now, and why should the rest of the world care?

  3. Regional Reality

    The evidence: what is actually true in this region.

  4. Responses, Experiments and Tensions

    The practical core: what is being tried, and where it is contested.

  5. Regional Synthesis

    What we learned, what challenged our assumptions and where we disagreed.

  6. Baton Question + Handover Out

    The signature moment. The baton never simply moves: it evolves.

Perspectives sought Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

What perspectives strengthen this inquiry?

The kinds of knowledge and experience this inquiry needs. They describe perspectives, not places: one person may bring several, and a strong case or a well-evidenced challenge counts as much as a title.

Knowledge must come from across the region, not from one part of it:

  • Northern Europe

    Credible knowledge from Northern Europe, without treating Nordic performance as the European standard.

  • Western Europe

    Credible knowledge from Western Europe, and not only from its two largest economies.

  • Southern Europe

    Credible knowledge from Southern Europe, framed by more than debt and unemployment.

  • Central Europe

    Credible knowledge from Central Europe, including its industrial and energy position.

  • Eastern Europe

    Credible knowledge from Eastern Europe, on more than security and conflict.

  • Southeast Europe and the Balkans

    Credible knowledge from Southeast Europe and the Balkans, including accession seen from the candidate side.

  • Non-EU Europe

    European states outside the Union, because membership is not the test of whether a European perspective matters.

View the knowledge this movement needs
  • Institutional adaptation

    Knowledge required Has changed how a mature institution works from inside it.

    Why this is needed The movement's central question is answered by people who have tried to do this.

  • European governance

    Knowledge required Works inside European decision-making, at any level of it.

    Why this is needed How a European decision is actually made determines how fast it can change.

  • Competitiveness and productivity

    Knowledge required Studies or acts on productivity and competitiveness in European economies.

    Why this is needed Competitiveness runs horizontally here rather than sitting in a section of its own.

  • Innovation commercialization

    Knowledge required Takes research out of a lab and into a product or company.

    Why this is needed The gap this region carries sits between invention and scale, and it is experienced here.

  • Scale-up finance

    Knowledge required Finances companies at the stage where European firms currently raise abroad.

    Why this is needed This is where institutional capability and financial systems either connect or do not.

  • Capital markets

    Knowledge required Works on capital-market structure, supervision or integration.

    Why this is needed Integration is attempted here repeatedly, and the people who know why it stalls are inside it.

  • Industrial policy

    Knowledge required Designs or delivers industrial strategy in a European economy.

    Why this is needed Decarbonisation, competitiveness and security meet in these instruments.

  • Energy systems

    Knowledge required Runs or plans an energy system: generation, grids, markets or supply.

    Why this is needed The energy question here is a system question, not a technology preference.

  • Contested energy mix perspectives

    Knowledge required Argues for nuclear, renewables, gas, storage or demand-side answers on the merits.

    Why this is needed The movement does not predetermine the mix, so it must hold the disagreement in the room.

  • Climate adaptation

    Knowledge required Delivers adaptation for infrastructure, cities, water or agriculture.

    Why this is needed Adaptation is treated as equal to mitigation in this movement, and it is delivered locally.

  • Infrastructure resilience

    Knowledge required Keeps physical systems working through conditions they were not designed for.

    Why this is needed This is where climate becomes an institutional and fiscal problem.

  • Demographics

    Knowledge required Works on ageing, fertility, participation or population structure.

    Why this is needed The demographic structure is the condition several other priorities are answering.

  • Labour markets

    Knowledge required Works on labour supply, shortages, mobility or participation.

    Why this is needed The labour model and the demographic model are colliding in these systems.

  • Migration systems

    Knowledge required Runs or studies asylum, residence or labour-migration systems.

    Why this is needed Migration here is demographic, economic and institutional at once.

  • Migrant integration

    Knowledge required Delivers integration, usually municipally, after arrival.

    Why this is needed Integration capacity is where migration becomes an institutional question rather than a border one.

  • Skills systems

    Knowledge required Builds skills systems for workers already in the labour market.

    Why this is needed Adaptation of the labour model runs through people already working.

  • Welfare and social systems

    Knowledge required Designs or runs pensions, care or social protection.

    Why this is needed These are the protections that renewal must not destroy, and the systems that must change.

  • AI and digital capability

    Knowledge required Builds or deploys AI and digital systems in European conditions.

    Why this is needed Capability and governance are tested against each other here, not in theory.

  • Technology governance

    Knowledge required Writes or applies technology regulation.

    Why this is needed The claim that governance and capability trade off is the claim to be tested.

  • Cybersecurity

    Knowledge required Defends infrastructure and institutions against digital attack.

    Why this is needed Security here includes what can be protected, not only what can be purchased.

  • Defence capability

    Knowledge required Works on military capability, readiness or coordination.

    Why this is needed The institutional question is whether capability can be coordinated at speed.

  • Defence industry

    Knowledge required Produces or procures defence equipment in Europe.

    Why this is needed Industrial capacity is the part of security that cannot be bought quickly.

  • Strategic autonomy and dependencies

    Knowledge required Analyses strategic dependence, supply chains or economic security.

    Why this is needed Dependence has to be governed rather than abolished, and that is a design question.

  • Supply chains

    Knowledge required Runs supply chains exposed to European and global disruption.

    Why this is needed Resilience and efficiency are traded against each other in these decisions.

  • European market integration

    Knowledge required Works on market integration in practice, in any sector.

    Why this is needed This is where legal integration and operational integration come apart.

  • Services integration

    Knowledge required Operates a regulated service across European borders.

    Why this is needed Services are the least integrated part of the Single Market and the largest part of the economy.

  • Regional inequality

    Knowledge required Works on cohesion and regional economic difference inside Europe.

    Why this is needed The continent's internal differences are wider than its averages suggest.

  • Ukraine and reconstruction

    Knowledge required Works on reconstruction, institutional reform or recovery in Ukraine.

    Why this is needed Reconstruction and integration are running concurrently, which is an institutional first.

  • Enlargement

    Knowledge required Works inside an accession process, on either side of it.

    Why this is needed Integration changes the system doing the integrating, and both sides know different halves of it.

  • Western Balkans

    Knowledge required Holds knowledge of the region's economies and institutions.

    Why this is needed Candidate states are European contributors, not an agenda item.

  • Municipal and urban systems

    Knowledge required Runs a city or a municipal service.

    Why this is needed Adaptation, housing, integration and infrastructure are delivered at this level.

  • Youth

    Knowledge required Is entering work, study or leadership in Europe now.

    Why this is needed They inherit the protections and the deferred adaptation both.

  • Business and SMEs

    Knowledge required Runs a firm that meets the regulatory and market surface directly.

    Why this is needed The fragmentation is a daily operational fact for these firms.

  • Civil society

    Knowledge required Works in civil society on trust, rights, cohesion or participation.

    Why this is needed Trust and legitimacy are the currency renewal spends, and this is where it is held.

The baton

The question moves

  1. It arrives. Sub-Saharan Africa hands this movement the question.
  2. This region changes it. Everything above is what it is changed by.
  3. It leaves changed. Global Convergence receives whatever this movement earns in the room.

No question is written in advance. Each movement's question is earned live, in the room, and published here once it has been.

Position in the relay Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

Final regional inquiry of Orbit 1

Europe is the eighth and final regional inquiry of Orbit 1, and it sits immediately before the point where the relay's mode changes from listening to connecting. That is a position in a sequence, not a promotion.

Europe completes the sequence. Europe does not complete the world's thinking.

Europe does not summarise, judge, represent or validate the other seven movements. It contributes situated regional knowledge exactly as they do, and the closure that follows it draws on all eight regions rather than on this one.

What becomes visible when eight regional realities are placed in relationship is earned during the live relay, not written here.

Global report contribution

What this movement will contribute

How this movement feeds the report

What this movement will contribute to the LEAD48 Global Leadership Report 2027. Every field is filled from the live movement, and disagreement is preserved rather than resolved. The record keeps what the evidence said, what LEAD48 inferred before the event, what contributors challenged or added, and what LEAD48 concluded afterwards, as four distinguishable layers. The pre-event version is never overwritten.

What this movement finds is written in the room during the relay and becomes its part of the LEAD48 Global Leadership Report 2027. How the five outputs work

Research gaps and limitations Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

What this evidence cannot show

These are limitations, not blockers. They are published so a reader can judge the evidence for themselves.

View what this evidence cannot show
  • Six response cases carry no verified figures of their own

    Capital-market integration, the clean industrial agenda, defence readiness, AI governance and capability, climate adaptation and parts of the enlargement case are described from the locked research without primary-source figures attached to the case itself. They say so rather than asserting numbers.

    Affects: Responses and experiments

  • The Single Market argument carries no measure of fragmentation

    The claim that legal integration exceeds operational integration is the movement's central institutional finding and is carried here as synthesis. No services-trade, cross-border investment or regulatory-barrier measure is attached, and the productivity gap is shown alongside it rather than as its cause.

    Affects: Prevailing conditions, Responses and experiments

  • The energy evidence predates the changes it is used to discuss

    The verified energy-import series stops in 2015, before the post-2022 changes in European sourcing. It is used to show structural import dependence and the range inside Europe, not the current position.

    Affects: Prevailing conditions, Responses and experiments, Planet

  • Net migration hides both flows

    A net annual figure cancels arrivals against departures, includes returning nationals, and says nothing about status, work or what followed arrival. It is used to show that movement runs in both directions across Europe, which is all it can show.

    Affects: Prevailing conditions, People

  • Productivity is measured per worker, not per hour

    Output per person employed moves with hours worked and participation as well as with productivity. The comparison with the United States is real and is not by itself an explanation of anything.

    Affects: Prevailing conditions

  • Subregional differentiation is country-led

    The seven analytical geographies are differentiated using country indicators rather than subregional series. It is better than a continental average and it is not subregional evidence.

    Affects: Inside the region

Research and evidence

See the evidence

Every claim on this page links here. Participants' contributions do not statistically represent the whole region.

View all 5 sources
  1. Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

    World Bank, World Development Indicators · 2023 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20) · Evidence period: 2023 · Geography: European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world

    Population: Gross domestic expenditure on research and development

    Limitations: Spending, not results. It measures what goes into research, not what comes out, and nothing here shows whether an invention is financed, commercialised or scaled afterwards, which is the question this evidence is being used to raise.

  2. GDP per person employed (constant 2021 PPP $)

    World Bank, World Development Indicators · 2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20) · Evidence period: 2024 · Geography: European states inside and outside the European Union, against the United States and the world

    Population: Output per employed person

    Limitations: Output per worker, not per hour, so it moves with working time and participation as well as with productivity itself. It says nothing about how output is distributed, what it costs in hours, or what the differences between these economies are made of.

  3. Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population)

    World Bank, World Development Indicators · 2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20) · Evidence period: 2024 · Geography: European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world

    Population: People aged 65 and over, per 100 people of working age

    Limitations: An age ratio, not a measure of dependence: it assumes everyone over 65 is supported and everyone of working age is working, which describes neither participation nor productivity. It shows the structural pressure on labour, care and pension systems rather than the outcome of it.

  4. Net migration

    World Bank, World Development Indicators · 2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20) · Evidence period: 2024 · Geography: European states inside and outside the European Union

    Population: Net number of people entering or leaving, over the year

    Limitations: A net figure, so arrivals and departures cancel each other out and neither is visible. It covers a single year, it includes returning nationals alongside new arrivals, and it carries no information about who moved, why, under what status or what happened after arrival.

  5. Energy imports, net (% of energy use)

    World Bank, World Development Indicators · 2015 (latest available series values, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-20) · Evidence period: 2015 · Geography: European states inside and outside the European Union, against the world

    Population: Net energy imports as a share of energy used

    Limitations: The series stops in 2015, which is before the changes in European energy sourcing after 2022, so it shows the structural position rather than the current one. It measures import dependence as a share of use, not price, security of a particular supply route, or what an economy could substitute.