Movement 04 of 08

East & Southeast Asia

Northeast Asia, Maritime Southeast Asia and Mainland Southeast Asia, with ASEAN as regional coordination architecture

No single country stands for this region. It is not China alone, not ASEAN alone, and not one industry alone: the movement holds three subregional realities and the architecture that coordinates part of them.

Broad window
Thu 20 May, about 6:00 PM to 9:00 PM Toronto timeIn Singapore: Fri 21 May, about 6:00 AM to 9:00 AM. The hours belong to the conversation, not to one region: contributors from anywhere take part wherever the question needs them.
Taking part
Contributor expressions of interest are not open.

The question in play

How must leadership change when the systems people depend on are changing faster than institutions can adapt?

The relay's opening question, carried from Toronto. Australia & Pacific transforms it live, and this movement receives that version when its own begins.

Regional reality

Regional Reality

East and Southeast Asia has become one of the world's most consequential engines of production, trade, technology and urban transformation through an extraordinary ability to coordinate people, capital, infrastructure and institutions at speed. But the capabilities that powered rapid development now face a different test. Technological change is accelerating, populations are ageing unevenly, energy demand is rising, global production networks are being reorganized, and climate and geopolitical shocks increasingly cross borders. The regional leadership challenge is therefore no longer simply how to accelerate development. It is how to renew institutions, workforces and systems while they are still operating at extraordinary scale and speed, without losing resilience, inclusion or legitimacy.

Acceleration → Coordination → Renewal

What these three words mean here
Acceleration
An extraordinary capacity to industrialize, trade, build infrastructure, urbanize, adopt technology and scale production, faster and further than almost anywhere else.
Coordination
Outcomes at that scale depend on coordination across government, business, infrastructure, labour, trade, digital systems, energy systems and regional institutions. Nothing here is delivered by one actor alone.
Renewal
Leadership increasingly requires changing successful systems before internal or external pressure makes change unavoidable. Success does not guarantee future fitness.

Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

The region's inquiry starts from one proposition, that success does not guarantee future fitness, and is organised around:

  • Renewing a development model that is still delivering
  • Governing technology that moves faster than institutions
  • Demographic divergence inside one region
  • Energy security and transition at the same time
  • Interdependence as both efficiency and exposure

This is what LEAD48's research sees in East & Southeast Asia: the tensions, the evidence and the questions it raises. It is where the inquiry starts, not a boundary around it. The conversation needs people who can strengthen it, challenge it, complicate it or take it somewhere it has not gone, and a well-evidenced challenge to this reading is as strong a contribution as support for it.

Prevailing conditions Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

What is changing here?

Each condition is backed by the sources listed with it. Open a source to see what it says and where it stops.

Productive scale increasingly requires continuous upgrading

Scale that was won by cost, volume and speed is held only by moving up: better productivity, deeper domestic linkages, higher-value work.

Detail and scope

The position that made an economy competitive does not stay competitive by itself, and the next stage asks for capabilities the first stage did not need, including firm-level productivity, skills and finance for smaller suppliers.

Scope: Visible across all three subregions, at very different stages and with very different room to manoeuvre.

  • Source World Bank (2026)

    Viet Nam Overview

    Reforms since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986 "helped transform Viet Nam from one of the world's poorest countries to a dynamic middle-income economy", with GDP per capita rising "from under $700 (1986) to nearly $4,500 (2023)" and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent, making it "one of the world's most open, trade-oriented economies". Reaching high-income status by 2045 requires it to "accelerate productivity, strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms, expand access to finance and technology for SMEs", against "rising challenges, including an aging population, global trade shifts, rapid automation, and climate risks".

    Published
    2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19)
    Evidence period
    1986 to 2023
    Geography
    Viet Nam
    Limitations
    A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.
  • Source World Bank (2026)

    Industrial Policy in the Digital Age: East Asia and Pacific Economic Update, April 2026 (overview)

    "Only about 13-17 percent of multinational enterprise subsidiaries in China and Thailand use AI, compared to 37 percent in the United States, and AI adoption is heavily concentrated among multinationals, with domestic firms lagging well behind", with diffusion limited by gaps in connectivity, skills and startup ecosystems.

    Published
    2026-04
    Evidence period
    Recent years to 2026
    Geography
    Developing East Asia and Pacific, with named comparisons for China, Thailand and the United States
    Limitations
    The report states that "assessing the true pace of adoption is complicated by the absence of a universal or consistent measure of AI use". The adoption figures cover multinational subsidiaries in two economies, not all firms, and some of its AI-use mapping draws on company data rather than official statistics. Only the overview was read.
View the other 4 conditions

Technological adoption is outrunning institutional and workforce adaptation

Deployment moves at the speed of investment; rules, skills and accountability move at the speed of institutions.

Detail and scope

The gap is not between advanced and backward economies. It is between the rate at which systems are adopted and the rate at which the workforces, regulators and accountability structures around them can adapt.

Scope: Region-wide, and sharpest where adoption is fastest.

  • Source Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) (2024)

    The Digital Divide Amongst MSMEs in ASEAN (ERIA Research Project Report 2024 No. 20)

    "In Malaysia, large and medium-sized companies averaged 20 digital tools compared with less than five amongst small or micro firms"; microenterprises have the lowest adoption rates for every tool; adoption of advanced tools including AI, IoT and robotics is "still widely low"; and only 5.6 per cent of surveyed firms received advice on suitable solutions from the public sector, against 29.4 per cent from the private sector.

    Published
    2024-09
    Evidence period
    Survey fieldwork March to July 2023
    Geography
    ASEAN: a web survey in all ten then-member states and a phone survey in Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam
    Limitations
    Self-reported survey data from 2023, before generative AI spread widely. Comparability across economies is only partial: the web panel does not match official statistics, some sample segments were filled from others, headline country comparisons rest on the three phone-survey countries, and it is not a representative national estimate for any country. The report's conclusion says both surveys covered all ten member states, which contradicts its own sampling table. It measures adoption, not productivity or causal effect.
  • Source World Bank (2026)

    Industrial Policy in the Digital Age: East Asia and Pacific Economic Update, April 2026 (overview)

    "Only about 13-17 percent of multinational enterprise subsidiaries in China and Thailand use AI, compared to 37 percent in the United States, and AI adoption is heavily concentrated among multinationals, with domestic firms lagging well behind", with diffusion limited by gaps in connectivity, skills and startup ecosystems.

    Published
    2026-04
    Evidence period
    Recent years to 2026
    Geography
    Developing East Asia and Pacific, with named comparisons for China, Thailand and the United States
    Limitations
    The report states that "assessing the true pace of adoption is complicated by the absence of a universal or consistent measure of AI use". The adoption figures cover multinational subsidiaries in two economies, not all firms, and some of its AI-use mapping draws on company data rather than official statistics. Only the overview was read.

Demographic divergence is rewriting the operating assumptions of growth

Within one region, some populations are ageing and contracting while others are young and still growing, which are opposite leadership problems.

Detail and scope

Models built on an expanding workforce do not transfer to a contracting one, and the policies of a contracting society do not fit an economy whose task is to employ a young population well.

Scope: Northeast Asia and parts of Mainland Southeast Asia face contraction; other economies face the opposite question.

  • Source World Bank (2026)

    Viet Nam Overview

    Reforms since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986 "helped transform Viet Nam from one of the world's poorest countries to a dynamic middle-income economy", with GDP per capita rising "from under $700 (1986) to nearly $4,500 (2023)" and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent, making it "one of the world's most open, trade-oriented economies". Reaching high-income status by 2045 requires it to "accelerate productivity, strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms, expand access to finance and technology for SMEs", against "rising challenges, including an aging population, global trade shifts, rapid automation, and climate risks".

    Published
    2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19)
    Evidence period
    1986 to 2023
    Geography
    Viet Nam
    Limitations
    A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.
  • Source United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024)

    World Population Prospects 2024: Summary of Results (advance unedited version)

    In 63 countries and areas the population peaked before 2024, a group that "includes China, Germany, Japan and the Russian Federation"; China and the Republic of Korea are among countries with ultra-low fertility below 1.4 births per woman, and among countries already past their peak the Republic of Korea had among the lowest fertility in 2024, below 0.75. Indonesia is among the countries still growing through 2054.

    Published
    2024-07-11
    Evidence period
    Estimates to 2024; projections from 2025
    Geography
    World, with named countries
    Limitations
    Figures for 2024 are estimates and later figures are projections. The key-findings list naming countries whose populations have peaked does not name the Republic of Korea explicitly, and the Philippines is not named as growing through 2054. It measures total population and fertility, not working-age population, labour-force participation or care demand.
  • Source Statistics Bureau of Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2026)

    Population Estimates, August 2026 report (Jinko Suikei)

    As at 1 March 2026 Japan's population was 122,811 thousand, down 610 thousand (0.49 per cent) on a year earlier; the population aged 15 to 64 fell by 265 thousand (0.36 per cent) to 73,290 thousand; and 29.5 per cent of the population was aged 65 and over.

    Published
    2026-08-20
    Evidence period
    Final estimates as at 1 March 2026; provisional as at 1 August 2026
    Geography
    Japan
    Limitations
    Monthly population estimates based on the 2020 Census, to be revised once the 2025 Census counts are released; the August figures are provisional. They measure population by age, not labour-force participation, care demand or productivity.
  • Source Ministry of Data and Statistics, Republic of Korea (formerly Statistics Korea) (2026)

    Preliminary Results of Birth and Death Statistics in 2025

    The total fertility rate was 0.72 in 2023 and 0.75 in 2024, and "marked 0.80 in 2025" on preliminary figures; deaths (363.4 thousand) exceeded births (254.5 thousand) by about 110 thousand.

    Published
    2026-02-25
    Evidence period
    2023 to 2025; 2025 preliminary
    Geography
    Republic of Korea
    Limitations
    Preliminary figures for 2025. It measures births, deaths and fertility, not the age structure, working-age population, labour-force participation or care demand, and a one-year rise in fertility is not a reversal of the trend.
  • Source National Bureau of Statistics of China (2026)

    Statistical Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2025 National Economic and Social Development

    "By the end of 2025, the total number of national population reached 1,404.89 million, a decrease of 3.39 million over that at the end of 2024", with 23.0 per cent aged 60 and over and 15.9 per cent aged 65 and over.

    Published
    2026-02-28
    Evidence period
    End of 2025
    Geography
    China
    Limitations
    National statistics using a working-age band of 16 to 59 rather than the 15 to 64 used elsewhere, so working-age shares are not directly comparable with Japan's or Korea's. It measures population and age structure, not labour-force participation or care demand.
  • Source National Institute of Statistics Timor-Leste (INETL) (2023)

    Timor-Leste Population and Housing Census 2022: Main Report

    "35 percent is below the age of 15, and 6 percent is 65 and over", a dependency ratio of 68, with population growth of 1.8 per cent a year between 2015 and 2022.

    Published
    2023-05
    Evidence period
    Census 2022, with growth measured from 2015
    Geography
    Timor-Leste
    Limitations
    A census count, not a projection. One country's age structure, published by the national statistics institute and hosted by UNFPA; it does not measure employment, the productivity of work, or labour-force participation.

Energy security, industrial growth and transition are colliding

Demand is rising, industry depends on reliable and affordable power, and the transition has to happen inside the same system at the same time.

Detail and scope

Grids, storage, finance, affordability and existing assets decide what is actually possible, which makes transition an industrial and institutional problem before it is a technology choice.

Scope: Shared across the region, with the constraint falling differently on exporters, importers and archipelagic systems.

  • Source Energy Market Authority, Singapore (2024)

    Singapore Doubles Power Import Capacity Under LTMS-PIP Phase 2

    "Phase Two of the LTMS-PIP will see electricity traded increase from up to 100 megawatts (MW) to a maximum of 200 MW. This is made possible by the introduction of multidirectional power trade under which additional supply will come from Malaysia." The project "was launched on 23 June 2022 and marked the first collaboration among four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states on multilateral cross-border electricity trading of renewable energy." The regulator's chief executive describes the enhancement as bringing the region "closer to achieving the vision of the ASEAN Power Grid", which is therefore not presented as achieved.

    Published
    2024-09-20
    Evidence period
    June 2022 to 2026
    Geography
    Lao PDR, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore
    Limitations
    A media release from one participating government's regulator, announcing a licence extension. It reports traded capacity rather than delivered energy, and says nothing about price, utilisation, or the rest of the ASEAN Power Grid's planned interconnections.
  • Source International Energy Agency (IEA) (2024)

    Southeast Asia Energy Outlook 2024 (World Energy Outlook Special Report)

    "At the end of 2023, Southeast Asia had 106 GW solar PV module manufacturing capacity", and Viet Nam, Thailand and Malaysia were the world's largest solar PV manufacturers after China. Clean energy drew around USD 32 billion of just over USD 70 billion in energy investment in 2023, only 2 per cent of global clean energy spending. In Viet Nam, "the renewable deployment boom was not matched with increased investment in transmission", which "led to curtailment and a slowdown of new investment".

    Published
    2024-10
    Evidence period
    End of 2023, with scenario projections to 2035 and 2050
    Geography
    The ten ASEAN member states in 2024
    Limitations
    IEA analysis drawing on commercial data inputs. Manufacturing figures are capacity, not production, and the plants are largely owned by Chinese companies. Its 2024 investment figure is described as an estimate, and all figures after 2024 are scenario projections. It gives no measured curtailment volume for any country.
  • Source International Energy Agency (IEA) (2025)

    Integrating Solar and Wind in Southeast Asia

    In Viet Nam, feed-in tariffs took solar and wind from less than 1 per cent of generation before 2019 to around 15 per cent in 2022, which exposed challenges in grid congestion, curtailment and system planning; Thailand, Indonesia and Viet Nam face contractual obligations that can lead to uneconomic curtailment of variable renewables.

    Published
    2025-09
    Evidence period
    2019 to 2025
    Geography
    Southeast Asia, with country detail for Viet Nam, Thailand and Indonesia
    Limitations
    Qualitative on curtailment: it names curtailment and grid congestion as consequences but reports no measured curtailment volume or rate for any country.

Interdependence creates efficiency and vulnerability simultaneously

The connected production, trade, energy and digital systems that made the region efficient are the same systems that transmit shocks through it.

Detail and scope

The same links carry both: concentration that lowers cost also concentrates exposure, and a disruption anywhere in the network is felt along all of it.

Scope: Region-wide, and increasingly the point at which regional coordination is tested.

  • Source ASEAN Single Window (2022)

    About ASEAN Single Window

    The ASEAN Single Window connects the National Single Windows of ASEAN Member States so that trade documents are submitted once and processed once for customs clearance. "The ratification of the Protocol on the Legal Framework to Implement the ASW (PLF) has enabled the live operation of the ASW among ASEAN Member States. In 2021, AMS have exchanged more than 900,000 of the ATIGA e-Form D through ASW." Other documents were being added one at a time: the ASEAN Customs Declaration Document exchange "started since December 2020 among Cambodia, Myanmar, and Singapore", with Malaysia and Thailand joining in 2021 and the Philippines in January 2022.

    Published
    2022 (undated page whose status text stops in 2022, accessed 2026-09-19)
    Evidence period
    2020 to 2022
    Geography
    The ASEAN Member States
    Limitations
    Published by the programme itself, so it reports its own progress. It counts documents exchanged rather than trade outcomes, says nothing about cost to run or about the traders who cannot use it, and its status text stops in 2022, so it is not evidence of current volumes. This record was read on the programme's own website on 2026-09-19. That website has since appeared in search indexes under unrelated gambling titles, so the link now points to ASEAN's official Single Window page on asean.org, which describes the same programme but does not carry the 2021 figure quoted here.
  • Source U.S. Geological Survey (2026)

    Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Nickel

    Indonesia mined 2,310,000 tons of nickel in 2024 and an estimated 2,600,000 tons in 2025, against world totals of 3,710,000 and an estimated 3,900,000 tons: roughly 62 percent of world mine production rising to roughly 67 percent, on reserves of 62,000,000 tons. Over the same period, "Production in Australia decreased by an estimated 54% after multiple companies placed mines into care-and-maintenance status owing to low prices", and in the Philippines production "declined by an estimated 24% after multiple mines reported production cuts".

    Published
    2026-02
    Evidence period
    2024, with 2025 estimated
    Geography
    World, reported by country of mine production
    Limitations
    Mine production and reserves only. It does not cover smelting, refining, downstream investment or who owns the capacity, the 2025 figures are estimates, and it reports quantities rather than the environmental, labour or revenue effects of where the mining happens.
  • Source World Trade Organization (2022)

    DS592: Indonesia, Measures Relating to Raw Materials

    The European Union challenged "(a) a prohibition on the exportation of nickel ore and; (b) a domestic processing requirement (DPR) for all nickel ore". The panel report, circulated on 30 November 2022, found both "inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994", and Indonesia notified its appeal on 8 December 2022.

    Published
    2022-11-30 (panel report circulated)
    Evidence period
    Consultations requested November 2019 to appeal notified December 2022
    Geography
    Indonesia
    Limitations
    A dispute record. It establishes the measures and the panel's legal finding; Indonesia appealed into an Appellate Body that is not operating, so the finding is not final. It establishes nothing about value captured by domestic processing, who owns the processing capacity, revenue, processing energy, or labour, environmental or community effects.

Inside the region Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

One region, several realities

None of these stands for the others.

  • Northeast Asia

    China, Japan, South Korea and their neighbours hold advanced manufacturing, technological scale, deep innovation systems and the region's most acute ageing and workforce contraction. Productivity, automation, energy and industrial renewal are the live questions. They are not interchangeable: their industrial structures, demographic positions and institutional settlements differ sharply, and what one is trying to renew is not what another is trying to build.

    • Source World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (2025)

      Global Innovation Index 2025: GII 2025 results

      "The Republic of Korea climbs to 4th place in 2025, its highest position to date"; "China enters the GII top 10 for the first time, leading globally in Knowledge and technology outputs"; and "Japan moves up one position to 12th in 2025, its highest rank since 2011".

      Published
      2025
      Evidence period
      Rankings mainly reflect data from 2023 to 2025
      Geography
      Economy-level ranks, including China, Japan and the Republic of Korea separately
      Limitations
      A composite index built from many indicators. It ranks innovation capacity and outputs; it does not measure manufacturing output, automation, productivity or whether innovation reaches ordinary firms, and WIPO cautions that ranks are not directly comparable across years.
    • Source World Bank, from UNESCO Institute for Statistics data (2023)

      World Development Indicators: Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

      R&D expenditure in 2023 was 4.94 per cent of GDP in the Republic of Korea, 3.44 per cent in Japan and 2.58 per cent in China.

      Published
      2023 (series values for 2023, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-21)
      Evidence period
      2022 and 2023
      Geography
      China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, each separately
      Limitations
      An input measure: spending, not innovation outcomes, productivity or diffusion. UNESCO figures can differ slightly from OECD MSTI figures for the same economies, so the two should not be mixed. 2023 is the latest year available for all three.
    • Source World Bank (2024)

      World Development Indicators: Manufacturing, value added (current US$)

      Manufacturing value added in 2024 was about USD 4.65 trillion in China, USD 788 billion in Japan and USD 499 billion in the Republic of Korea, in current US dollars.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-21)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, each separately
      Limitations
      Nominal US dollars, so exchange rates move the figures heavily: Japan's fall from about USD 1.03 trillion in 2021 to USD 788 billion in 2024 largely reflects the yen, not necessarily output. A measure of scale, not of productivity, technology intensity or automation, and not a growth trend.
    • Source Statistics Bureau of Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2026)

      Population Estimates, August 2026 report (Jinko Suikei)

      As at 1 March 2026 Japan's population was 122,811 thousand, down 610 thousand (0.49 per cent) on a year earlier; the population aged 15 to 64 fell by 265 thousand (0.36 per cent) to 73,290 thousand; and 29.5 per cent of the population was aged 65 and over.

      Published
      2026-08-20
      Evidence period
      Final estimates as at 1 March 2026; provisional as at 1 August 2026
      Geography
      Japan
      Limitations
      Monthly population estimates based on the 2020 Census, to be revised once the 2025 Census counts are released; the August figures are provisional. They measure population by age, not labour-force participation, care demand or productivity.
    • Source Ministry of Data and Statistics, Republic of Korea (formerly Statistics Korea) (2026)

      Preliminary Results of Birth and Death Statistics in 2025

      The total fertility rate was 0.72 in 2023 and 0.75 in 2024, and "marked 0.80 in 2025" on preliminary figures; deaths (363.4 thousand) exceeded births (254.5 thousand) by about 110 thousand.

      Published
      2026-02-25
      Evidence period
      2023 to 2025; 2025 preliminary
      Geography
      Republic of Korea
      Limitations
      Preliminary figures for 2025. It measures births, deaths and fertility, not the age structure, working-age population, labour-force participation or care demand, and a one-year rise in fertility is not a reversal of the trend.
    • Source National Bureau of Statistics of China (2026)

      Statistical Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2025 National Economic and Social Development

      "By the end of 2025, the total number of national population reached 1,404.89 million, a decrease of 3.39 million over that at the end of 2024", with 23.0 per cent aged 60 and over and 15.9 per cent aged 65 and over.

      Published
      2026-02-28
      Evidence period
      End of 2025
      Geography
      China
      Limitations
      National statistics using a working-age band of 16 to 59 rather than the 15 to 64 used elsewhere, so working-age shares are not directly comparable with Japan's or Korea's. It measures population and age structure, not labour-force participation or care demand.
    • Source United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024)

      World Population Prospects 2024: Summary of Results (advance unedited version)

      In 63 countries and areas the population peaked before 2024, a group that "includes China, Germany, Japan and the Russian Federation"; China and the Republic of Korea are among countries with ultra-low fertility below 1.4 births per woman, and among countries already past their peak the Republic of Korea had among the lowest fertility in 2024, below 0.75. Indonesia is among the countries still growing through 2054.

      Published
      2024-07-11
      Evidence period
      Estimates to 2024; projections from 2025
      Geography
      World, with named countries
      Limitations
      Figures for 2024 are estimates and later figures are projections. The key-findings list naming countries whose populations have peaked does not name the Republic of Korea explicitly, and the Philippines is not named as growing through 2054. It measures total population and fertility, not working-age population, labour-force participation or care demand.
View the other 3
  • Maritime Southeast Asia

    Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and Timor-Leste span archipelagic geography, wide demographic diversity, fast urbanization, manufacturing, rapid digital adoption, energy constraints, critical minerals, migration and high disaster exposure. Singapore's institutional capacity is not the subregion's condition and must not be read as representing it.

    • Source U.S. Geological Survey (2026)

      Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Nickel

      Indonesia mined 2,310,000 tons of nickel in 2024 and an estimated 2,600,000 tons in 2025, against world totals of 3,710,000 and an estimated 3,900,000 tons: roughly 62 percent of world mine production rising to roughly 67 percent, on reserves of 62,000,000 tons. Over the same period, "Production in Australia decreased by an estimated 54% after multiple companies placed mines into care-and-maintenance status owing to low prices", and in the Philippines production "declined by an estimated 24% after multiple mines reported production cuts".

      Published
      2026-02
      Evidence period
      2024, with 2025 estimated
      Geography
      World, reported by country of mine production
      Limitations
      Mine production and reserves only. It does not cover smelting, refining, downstream investment or who owns the capacity, the 2025 figures are estimates, and it reports quantities rather than the environmental, labour or revenue effects of where the mining happens.
    • Source National Institute of Statistics Timor-Leste (INETL) (2023)

      Timor-Leste Population and Housing Census 2022: Main Report

      "35 percent is below the age of 15, and 6 percent is 65 and over", a dependency ratio of 68, with population growth of 1.8 per cent a year between 2015 and 2022.

      Published
      2023-05
      Evidence period
      Census 2022, with growth measured from 2015
      Geography
      Timor-Leste
      Limitations
      A census count, not a projection. One country's age structure, published by the national statistics institute and hosted by UNFPA; it does not measure employment, the productivity of work, or labour-force participation.
    • Source Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Republic of Indonesia (ESDM), press release 549.Pers/04/SJI/2019 (2019)

      Bijih Nikel Tidak Boleh Diekspor Lagi per Januari 2020 (Nickel ore may no longer be exported from January 2020)

      "Terhitung mulai 1 Januari 2020 bijih nikel dengan kadar di bawah 1,7% tidak lagi diperbolehkan untuk diekspor": from 1 January 2020, nickel ore below 1.7 per cent grade may no longer be exported.

      Published
      2019-09-02
      Evidence period
      Announced 2019; effective 1 January 2020
      Geography
      Indonesia
      Limitations
      An announcement of a future ban, not evidence of how it was enforced or what it achieved. It establishes nothing about downstream investment, value capture, ownership, revenue sharing or effects on communities or producers elsewhere.
    • Source World Trade Organization (2022)

      DS592: Indonesia, Measures Relating to Raw Materials

      The European Union challenged "(a) a prohibition on the exportation of nickel ore and; (b) a domestic processing requirement (DPR) for all nickel ore". The panel report, circulated on 30 November 2022, found both "inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994", and Indonesia notified its appeal on 8 December 2022.

      Published
      2022-11-30 (panel report circulated)
      Evidence period
      Consultations requested November 2019 to appeal notified December 2022
      Geography
      Indonesia
      Limitations
      A dispute record. It establishes the measures and the panel's legal finding; Indonesia appealed into an Appellate Body that is not operating, so the finding is not final. It establishes nothing about value captured by domestic processing, who owns the processing capacity, revenue, processing energy, or labour, environmental or community effects.
  • Mainland Southeast Asia

    Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar sit inside manufacturing and logistics networks that cross their borders, with shared river systems, energy interdependence, very different demographic trajectories and very uneven productive capacity. Industrial upgrading and connectivity are common themes with uncommon starting points.

    • Source World Bank (2026)

      Viet Nam Overview

      Reforms since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986 "helped transform Viet Nam from one of the world's poorest countries to a dynamic middle-income economy", with GDP per capita rising "from under $700 (1986) to nearly $4,500 (2023)" and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent, making it "one of the world's most open, trade-oriented economies". Reaching high-income status by 2045 requires it to "accelerate productivity, strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms, expand access to finance and technology for SMEs", against "rising challenges, including an aging population, global trade shifts, rapid automation, and climate risks".

      Published
      2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      1986 to 2023
      Geography
      Viet Nam
      Limitations
      A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.
    • Source Energy Market Authority, Singapore (2024)

      Singapore Doubles Power Import Capacity Under LTMS-PIP Phase 2

      "Phase Two of the LTMS-PIP will see electricity traded increase from up to 100 megawatts (MW) to a maximum of 200 MW. This is made possible by the introduction of multidirectional power trade under which additional supply will come from Malaysia." The project "was launched on 23 June 2022 and marked the first collaboration among four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states on multilateral cross-border electricity trading of renewable energy." The regulator's chief executive describes the enhancement as bringing the region "closer to achieving the vision of the ASEAN Power Grid", which is therefore not presented as achieved.

      Published
      2024-09-20
      Evidence period
      June 2022 to 2026
      Geography
      Lao PDR, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore
      Limitations
      A media release from one participating government's regulator, announcing a licence extension. It reports traded capacity rather than delivered energy, and says nothing about price, utilisation, or the rest of the ASEAN Power Grid's planned interconnections.
    • Source International Energy Agency (IEA) (2025)

      Integrating Solar and Wind in Southeast Asia

      In Viet Nam, feed-in tariffs took solar and wind from less than 1 per cent of generation before 2019 to around 15 per cent in 2022, which exposed challenges in grid congestion, curtailment and system planning; Thailand, Indonesia and Viet Nam face contractual obligations that can lead to uneconomic curtailment of variable renewables.

      Published
      2025-09
      Evidence period
      2019 to 2025
      Geography
      Southeast Asia, with country detail for Viet Nam, Thailand and Indonesia
      Limitations
      Qualitative on curtailment: it names curtailment and grid congestion as consequences but reports no measured curtailment volume or rate for any country.
    • Source International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (2026)

      IRENASTAT: Electricity capacity statistics (2026 H1 dataset)

      Installed on-grid renewable capacity at the end of 2025 was about 50,604 MW in Viet Nam, 15,632 MW in Thailand, 10,343 MW in the Philippines, 10,398 MW in Indonesia and 9,746 MW in Malaysia.

      Published
      2026 (queried from IRENASTAT on 2026-09-21)
      Evidence period
      End of 2025
      Geography
      Viet Nam, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, each separately
      Limitations
      Installed capacity, not electricity generated or delivered, capacity factors or curtailment. Malaysia's 2025 values are identical to 2024 and may be carried forward. IRENA's capacity accounting differs from IEA modelling, so the two sets of figures should not be combined.
  • ASEAN, as coordination architecture

    ASEAN is not a subregion but the mechanism through which sovereign states coordinate trade, customs, digital rules, energy and disaster response without merging. Its instruments are interoperability agreements rather than transfers of authority, which is what makes them adoptable and what limits what they can compel.

    How much coordination can sovereign states achieve without becoming one state?

    • Source ASEAN Single Window (2022)

      About ASEAN Single Window

      The ASEAN Single Window connects the National Single Windows of ASEAN Member States so that trade documents are submitted once and processed once for customs clearance. "The ratification of the Protocol on the Legal Framework to Implement the ASW (PLF) has enabled the live operation of the ASW among ASEAN Member States. In 2021, AMS have exchanged more than 900,000 of the ATIGA e-Form D through ASW." Other documents were being added one at a time: the ASEAN Customs Declaration Document exchange "started since December 2020 among Cambodia, Myanmar, and Singapore", with Malaysia and Thailand joining in 2021 and the Philippines in January 2022.

      Published
      2022 (undated page whose status text stops in 2022, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      2020 to 2022
      Geography
      The ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      Published by the programme itself, so it reports its own progress. It counts documents exchanged rather than trade outcomes, says nothing about cost to run or about the traders who cannot use it, and its status text stops in 2022, so it is not evidence of current volumes. This record was read on the programme's own website on 2026-09-19. That website has since appeared in search indexes under unrelated gambling titles, so the link now points to ASEAN's official Single Window page on asean.org, which describes the same programme but does not carry the 2021 figure quoted here.
    • Source AHA Centre, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (2026)

      About us

      The AHA Centre is "an intergovernmental organisation, established by the ten ASEAN Member States with the aim to facilitate cooperation and coordination of disaster management amongst ASEAN Member States", created by an agreement signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on November 17, 2011. It works primarily with the National Disaster Management Organisations of the Member States, reports to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management, whose members serve as its Governing Board, and is affirmed as "the primary ASEAN regional coordinating agency on disaster management and emergency response" by the One ASEAN One Response declaration and ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management.

      Published
      2026 (undated page, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      2011 to 2026
      Geography
      The ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      The Centre's own account of its mandate, not an evaluation of how it performed in any particular emergency. The page is internally inconsistent about membership, referring to both ten and eleven Member States, and it carries no publication date.
    • Source Energy Market Authority, Singapore (2024)

      Singapore Doubles Power Import Capacity Under LTMS-PIP Phase 2

      "Phase Two of the LTMS-PIP will see electricity traded increase from up to 100 megawatts (MW) to a maximum of 200 MW. This is made possible by the introduction of multidirectional power trade under which additional supply will come from Malaysia." The project "was launched on 23 June 2022 and marked the first collaboration among four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states on multilateral cross-border electricity trading of renewable energy." The regulator's chief executive describes the enhancement as bringing the region "closer to achieving the vision of the ASEAN Power Grid", which is therefore not presented as achieved.

      Published
      2024-09-20
      Evidence period
      June 2022 to 2026
      Geography
      Lao PDR, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore
      Limitations
      A media release from one participating government's regulator, announcing a licence extension. It reports traded capacity rather than delivered energy, and says nothing about price, utilisation, or the rest of the ASEAN Power Grid's planned interconnections.
    • Source ASEAN Secretariat (Chairperson of the ASEAN SEOM, ASEAN Philippines 2026) (2026)

      Statement of the Chairperson of the ASEAN Senior Economic Officials (SEOM) on the Conclusion of ASEAN DEFA Negotiations

      ASEAN SEOM "successfully resolved all outstanding issues in the negotiations of the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA)" in Manila on 27-29 May 2026, marking the conclusion of negotiations on ASEAN's first region-wide digital economy agreement, and "looks forward to the signing of the ASEAN DEFA in November 2026".

      Published
      2026-05-30
      Evidence period
      Negotiations concluded at the Second Meeting of the 57th ASEAN SEOM, Manila, 27-29 May 2026
      Geography
      ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      An official statement announcing that negotiations concluded. Concluding negotiations is not signature, ratification, entry into force or implementation, and the statement itself says signing is expected in November 2026. Its projection that the digital economy could double to USD 2 trillion by 2030 is conditional and attributed to studies it does not name. It establishes no outcome of any kind.
    • Source ASEAN Secretariat (2024)

      ASEAN Fully Implement e-Form D through the ASEAN Single Window

      "ASEAN Member States started fully implementing the issuance and acceptance of e-Form D through the ASEAN Single Window (ASW) on 1 January 2024. From now on, hard copies of Form D will only be issued and accepted when technical issues are taken place."

      Published
      2024-01-01
      Evidence period
      From 1 January 2024
      Geography
      ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      An announcement of full implementation. It reports no volumes, and establishes nothing about trade growth, clearance times, costs, or which traders can use the system.
    • Source ASEAN Secretariat (ASEAN Malaysia 2025) (2025)

      Chairman's Statement of the 47th ASEAN Summit

      "We welcomed the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste as the 11th Member State of ASEAN" at the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025.

      Published
      2025-10-26
      Evidence period
      47th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 2025
      Geography
      ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      A chairman's statement. It establishes Timor-Leste's admission as a member; it also records that Timor-Leste still has roadmap criteria to implement, and it says nothing about any ASEAN body's performance.

Who experiences the region differently Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

Who experiences this differently?

No region is a single story. These groups are named from the evidence, not as a complete list.

  • Ageing and contracting workforces

    In parts of Northeast Asia, and increasingly in Thailand and coastal China, the workforce is shrinking while care demand rises. The leadership problem is how to sustain output and dignity with fewer working-age people, not how to absorb more of them. Attached evidence covers Japan, the Republic of Korea and China at national level, each measured separately: total-population decline, working-age contraction, fertility and the share aged 60 or 65 and over are different measures and are not combined here. Care demand and labour-force participation are not yet measured, and neither Thailand nor the difference within China is yet evidenced.

    • Source Statistics Bureau of Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2026)

      Population Estimates, August 2026 report (Jinko Suikei)

      As at 1 March 2026 Japan's population was 122,811 thousand, down 610 thousand (0.49 per cent) on a year earlier; the population aged 15 to 64 fell by 265 thousand (0.36 per cent) to 73,290 thousand; and 29.5 per cent of the population was aged 65 and over.

      Published
      2026-08-20
      Evidence period
      Final estimates as at 1 March 2026; provisional as at 1 August 2026
      Geography
      Japan
      Limitations
      Monthly population estimates based on the 2020 Census, to be revised once the 2025 Census counts are released; the August figures are provisional. They measure population by age, not labour-force participation, care demand or productivity.
    • Source Ministry of Data and Statistics, Republic of Korea (formerly Statistics Korea) (2026)

      Preliminary Results of Birth and Death Statistics in 2025

      The total fertility rate was 0.72 in 2023 and 0.75 in 2024, and "marked 0.80 in 2025" on preliminary figures; deaths (363.4 thousand) exceeded births (254.5 thousand) by about 110 thousand.

      Published
      2026-02-25
      Evidence period
      2023 to 2025; 2025 preliminary
      Geography
      Republic of Korea
      Limitations
      Preliminary figures for 2025. It measures births, deaths and fertility, not the age structure, working-age population, labour-force participation or care demand, and a one-year rise in fertility is not a reversal of the trend.
    • Source National Bureau of Statistics of China (2026)

      Statistical Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2025 National Economic and Social Development

      "By the end of 2025, the total number of national population reached 1,404.89 million, a decrease of 3.39 million over that at the end of 2024", with 23.0 per cent aged 60 and over and 15.9 per cent aged 65 and over.

      Published
      2026-02-28
      Evidence period
      End of 2025
      Geography
      China
      Limitations
      National statistics using a working-age band of 16 to 59 rather than the 15 to 64 used elsewhere, so working-age shares are not directly comparable with Japan's or Korea's. It measures population and age structure, not labour-force participation or care demand.
    • Source United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024)

      World Population Prospects 2024: Summary of Results (advance unedited version)

      In 63 countries and areas the population peaked before 2024, a group that "includes China, Germany, Japan and the Russian Federation"; China and the Republic of Korea are among countries with ultra-low fertility below 1.4 births per woman, and among countries already past their peak the Republic of Korea had among the lowest fertility in 2024, below 0.75. Indonesia is among the countries still growing through 2054.

      Published
      2024-07-11
      Evidence period
      Estimates to 2024; projections from 2025
      Geography
      World, with named countries
      Limitations
      Figures for 2024 are estimates and later figures are projections. The key-findings list naming countries whose populations have peaked does not name the Republic of Korea explicitly, and the Philippines is not named as growing through 2054. It measures total population and fertility, not working-age population, labour-force participation or care demand.
View the other 4 groups
  • Young and growing workforces

    In Indonesia, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos and Timor-Leste, the task is the opposite: creating work that is productive enough to raise incomes for a young population, at the same time as automation changes what entry-level work is. Attached national evidence currently covers Timor-Leste, and the UN projects Indonesia's population still growing through 2054; the Philippines, Cambodia and Laos are named from the locked synthesis without attached national figures.

    • Source National Institute of Statistics Timor-Leste (INETL) (2023)

      Timor-Leste Population and Housing Census 2022: Main Report

      "35 percent is below the age of 15, and 6 percent is 65 and over", a dependency ratio of 68, with population growth of 1.8 per cent a year between 2015 and 2022.

      Published
      2023-05
      Evidence period
      Census 2022, with growth measured from 2015
      Geography
      Timor-Leste
      Limitations
      A census count, not a projection. One country's age structure, published by the national statistics institute and hosted by UNFPA; it does not measure employment, the productivity of work, or labour-force participation.
    • Source United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024)

      World Population Prospects 2024: Summary of Results (advance unedited version)

      In 63 countries and areas the population peaked before 2024, a group that "includes China, Germany, Japan and the Russian Federation"; China and the Republic of Korea are among countries with ultra-low fertility below 1.4 births per woman, and among countries already past their peak the Republic of Korea had among the lowest fertility in 2024, below 0.75. Indonesia is among the countries still growing through 2054.

      Published
      2024-07-11
      Evidence period
      Estimates to 2024; projections from 2025
      Geography
      World, with named countries
      Limitations
      Figures for 2024 are estimates and later figures are projections. The key-findings list naming countries whose populations have peaked does not name the Republic of Korea explicitly, and the Philippines is not named as growing through 2054. It measures total population and fertility, not working-age population, labour-force participation or care demand.
  • Small and medium firms, and the people who work in them

    Most employment in the region sits in firms far from the technological frontier. Their access to finance, skills and technology decides whether upgrading reaches the workforce or stays inside a few exporting firms.

    • Source World Bank (2026)

      Viet Nam Overview

      Reforms since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986 "helped transform Viet Nam from one of the world's poorest countries to a dynamic middle-income economy", with GDP per capita rising "from under $700 (1986) to nearly $4,500 (2023)" and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent, making it "one of the world's most open, trade-oriented economies". Reaching high-income status by 2045 requires it to "accelerate productivity, strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms, expand access to finance and technology for SMEs", against "rising challenges, including an aging population, global trade shifts, rapid automation, and climate risks".

      Published
      2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      1986 to 2023
      Geography
      Viet Nam
      Limitations
      A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.
    • Source Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) (2024)

      The Digital Divide Amongst MSMEs in ASEAN (ERIA Research Project Report 2024 No. 20)

      "In Malaysia, large and medium-sized companies averaged 20 digital tools compared with less than five amongst small or micro firms"; microenterprises have the lowest adoption rates for every tool; adoption of advanced tools including AI, IoT and robotics is "still widely low"; and only 5.6 per cent of surveyed firms received advice on suitable solutions from the public sector, against 29.4 per cent from the private sector.

      Published
      2024-09
      Evidence period
      Survey fieldwork March to July 2023
      Geography
      ASEAN: a web survey in all ten then-member states and a phone survey in Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam
      Limitations
      Self-reported survey data from 2023, before generative AI spread widely. Comparability across economies is only partial: the web panel does not match official statistics, some sample segments were filled from others, headline country comparisons rest on the three phone-survey countries, and it is not a representative national estimate for any country. The report's conclusion says both surveys covered all ten member states, which contradicts its own sampling table. It measures adoption, not productivity or causal effect.
  • Migrant and mobile workers

    Labour moves across the region's borders in large numbers, into construction, care, agriculture, fishing, manufacturing and domestic work. Their conditions are set by systems in two countries at once, and they are rarely in the room where either is designed.

  • Communities in the path of recurring disaster

    Typhoons, earthquakes, floods and volcanic activity fall repeatedly on the same coastal, riverine and island communities, whose local knowledge and preparation are part of the region's response capability rather than an audience for it.

    • Source AHA Centre, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (2026)

      About us

      The AHA Centre is "an intergovernmental organisation, established by the ten ASEAN Member States with the aim to facilitate cooperation and coordination of disaster management amongst ASEAN Member States", created by an agreement signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on November 17, 2011. It works primarily with the National Disaster Management Organisations of the Member States, reports to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management, whose members serve as its Governing Board, and is affirmed as "the primary ASEAN regional coordinating agency on disaster management and emergency response" by the One ASEAN One Response declaration and ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management.

      Published
      2026 (undated page, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      2011 to 2026
      Geography
      The ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      The Centre's own account of its mandate, not an evaluation of how it performed in any particular emergency. The page is internally inconsistent about membership, referring to both ten and eleven Member States, and it carries no publication date.

What the evidence complicates Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

What might we be getting wrong?

  • Common assumption

    Fast-growing systems should keep doing what made them successful.

    What the evidence shows

    Past success can become a barrier to renewal. The capabilities, institutions and incentives built for one stage are exactly what make the next stage hard to start, and a model that is still producing results is the hardest one to change.

    • Source World Bank (2026)

      Viet Nam Overview

      Reforms since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986 "helped transform Viet Nam from one of the world's poorest countries to a dynamic middle-income economy", with GDP per capita rising "from under $700 (1986) to nearly $4,500 (2023)" and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent, making it "one of the world's most open, trade-oriented economies". Reaching high-income status by 2045 requires it to "accelerate productivity, strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms, expand access to finance and technology for SMEs", against "rising challenges, including an aging population, global trade shifts, rapid automation, and climate risks".

      Published
      2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      1986 to 2023
      Geography
      Viet Nam
      Limitations
      A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.
View the other 4 assumptions
  • Common assumption

    AI leadership means building the most advanced models.

    What the evidence shows

    Diffusion, skills, governance and productive use determine broad value. The economic result comes from how widely a technology is absorbed into ordinary firms and public systems, not from who holds the frontier.

  • Common assumption

    Ageing is one East Asian problem.

    What the evidence shows

    Demographic trajectories vary sharply across the region. Contraction, rapid ageing before high income, and still-young populations coexist inside it, and each implies a different set of leadership choices.

    • Source World Bank (2026)

      Viet Nam Overview

      Reforms since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986 "helped transform Viet Nam from one of the world's poorest countries to a dynamic middle-income economy", with GDP per capita rising "from under $700 (1986) to nearly $4,500 (2023)" and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent, making it "one of the world's most open, trade-oriented economies". Reaching high-income status by 2045 requires it to "accelerate productivity, strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms, expand access to finance and technology for SMEs", against "rising challenges, including an aging population, global trade shifts, rapid automation, and climate risks".

      Published
      2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      1986 to 2023
      Geography
      Viet Nam
      Limitations
      A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.
  • Common assumption

    Regional integration requires surrendering sovereignty.

    What the evidence shows

    Interoperability can coordinate sovereign systems without political unification. The region's working instruments connect national systems to each other and leave authority where it was, which is why they were adoptable at all.

    • Source ASEAN Single Window (2022)

      About ASEAN Single Window

      The ASEAN Single Window connects the National Single Windows of ASEAN Member States so that trade documents are submitted once and processed once for customs clearance. "The ratification of the Protocol on the Legal Framework to Implement the ASW (PLF) has enabled the live operation of the ASW among ASEAN Member States. In 2021, AMS have exchanged more than 900,000 of the ATIGA e-Form D through ASW." Other documents were being added one at a time: the ASEAN Customs Declaration Document exchange "started since December 2020 among Cambodia, Myanmar, and Singapore", with Malaysia and Thailand joining in 2021 and the Philippines in January 2022.

      Published
      2022 (undated page whose status text stops in 2022, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      2020 to 2022
      Geography
      The ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      Published by the programme itself, so it reports its own progress. It counts documents exchanged rather than trade outcomes, says nothing about cost to run or about the traders who cannot use it, and its status text stops in 2022, so it is not evidence of current volumes. This record was read on the programme's own website on 2026-09-19. That website has since appeared in search indexes under unrelated gambling titles, so the link now points to ASEAN's official Single Window page on asean.org, which describes the same programme but does not carry the 2021 figure quoted here.
    • Source AHA Centre, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (2026)

      About us

      The AHA Centre is "an intergovernmental organisation, established by the ten ASEAN Member States with the aim to facilitate cooperation and coordination of disaster management amongst ASEAN Member States", created by an agreement signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on November 17, 2011. It works primarily with the National Disaster Management Organisations of the Member States, reports to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management, whose members serve as its Governing Board, and is affirmed as "the primary ASEAN regional coordinating agency on disaster management and emergency response" by the One ASEAN One Response declaration and ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management.

      Published
      2026 (undated page, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      2011 to 2026
      Geography
      The ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      The Centre's own account of its mandate, not an evaluation of how it performed in any particular emergency. The page is internally inconsistent about membership, referring to both ten and eleven Member States, and it carries no publication date.
  • Common assumption

    Energy transition means replacing fossil fuels with renewables.

    What the evidence shows

    Transition also requires grids, storage, finance, affordability, reliability, industrial restructuring and the management of existing assets. Generation is the part that is easiest to announce and the smallest part of the problem.

    • Source Energy Market Authority, Singapore (2024)

      Singapore Doubles Power Import Capacity Under LTMS-PIP Phase 2

      "Phase Two of the LTMS-PIP will see electricity traded increase from up to 100 megawatts (MW) to a maximum of 200 MW. This is made possible by the introduction of multidirectional power trade under which additional supply will come from Malaysia." The project "was launched on 23 June 2022 and marked the first collaboration among four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states on multilateral cross-border electricity trading of renewable energy." The regulator's chief executive describes the enhancement as bringing the region "closer to achieving the vision of the ASEAN Power Grid", which is therefore not presented as achieved.

      Published
      2024-09-20
      Evidence period
      June 2022 to 2026
      Geography
      Lao PDR, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore
      Limitations
      A media release from one participating government's regulator, announcing a licence extension. It reports traded capacity rather than delivered energy, and says nothing about price, utilisation, or the rest of the ASEAN Power Grid's planned interconnections.

Leadership challenges Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

What must leaders do?

The conversations this region will prioritise. Not a ranking of the region's biggest problems.

  1. Renew the Development Engine

    How do leaders change a model that is still producing results before its limitations become a crisis?

    The hardest renewal is the one nothing is yet forcing. The region's question is how to start changing a working model while the results still look good.

    4P: Portfolio, Process, PeopleSDGs: 8, 9

    Rests on: Productive scale increasingly requires continuous upgrading

    • Source World Bank (2026)

      Viet Nam Overview

      Reforms since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986 "helped transform Viet Nam from one of the world's poorest countries to a dynamic middle-income economy", with GDP per capita rising "from under $700 (1986) to nearly $4,500 (2023)" and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent, making it "one of the world's most open, trade-oriented economies". Reaching high-income status by 2045 requires it to "accelerate productivity, strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms, expand access to finance and technology for SMEs", against "rising challenges, including an aging population, global trade shifts, rapid automation, and climate risks".

      Published
      2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      1986 to 2023
      Geography
      Viet Nam
      Limitations
      A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.
View the other 4 priorities
  1. Govern Acceleration

    How can institutions, skills and accountability evolve at the speed of technological change?

    Adoption is not the constraint. The constraint is whether rules, capabilities and accountability can be rebuilt fast enough to make adoption worth it.

    4P: Process, PeopleSDGs: 9, 16, 4

    Rests on: Technological adoption is outrunning institutional and workforce adaptation

  2. Redesign for Demographic Divergence

    How should leadership change when populations are ageing, shrinking or remaining young at radically different rates?

    One region, opposite demographic problems. What is transferable between them, and what is not, is itself the question.

    4P: People, PortfolioSDGs: 8, 10, 5

    Rests on: Demographic divergence is rewriting the operating assumptions of growth

    • Source World Bank (2026)

      Viet Nam Overview

      Reforms since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986 "helped transform Viet Nam from one of the world's poorest countries to a dynamic middle-income economy", with GDP per capita rising "from under $700 (1986) to nearly $4,500 (2023)" and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent, making it "one of the world's most open, trade-oriented economies". Reaching high-income status by 2045 requires it to "accelerate productivity, strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms, expand access to finance and technology for SMEs", against "rising challenges, including an aging population, global trade shifts, rapid automation, and climate risks".

      Published
      2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      1986 to 2023
      Geography
      Viet Nam
      Limitations
      A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.
  3. Secure the Transition

    How do leaders transform energy and industrial systems without sacrificing affordability, reliability or livelihoods?

    The transition has to be built inside a system that must keep running, for industries and households that cannot pause while it happens.

    4P: Planet, Portfolio, ProcessSDGs: 7, 12, 13

    Rests on: Energy security, industrial growth and transition are colliding

    • Source Energy Market Authority, Singapore (2024)

      Singapore Doubles Power Import Capacity Under LTMS-PIP Phase 2

      "Phase Two of the LTMS-PIP will see electricity traded increase from up to 100 megawatts (MW) to a maximum of 200 MW. This is made possible by the introduction of multidirectional power trade under which additional supply will come from Malaysia." The project "was launched on 23 June 2022 and marked the first collaboration among four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states on multilateral cross-border electricity trading of renewable energy." The regulator's chief executive describes the enhancement as bringing the region "closer to achieving the vision of the ASEAN Power Grid", which is therefore not presented as achieved.

      Published
      2024-09-20
      Evidence period
      June 2022 to 2026
      Geography
      Lao PDR, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore
      Limitations
      A media release from one participating government's regulator, announcing a licence extension. It reports traded capacity rather than delivered energy, and says nothing about price, utilisation, or the rest of the ASEAN Power Grid's planned interconnections.
    • Source U.S. Geological Survey (2026)

      Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Nickel

      Indonesia mined 2,310,000 tons of nickel in 2024 and an estimated 2,600,000 tons in 2025, against world totals of 3,710,000 and an estimated 3,900,000 tons: roughly 62 percent of world mine production rising to roughly 67 percent, on reserves of 62,000,000 tons. Over the same period, "Production in Australia decreased by an estimated 54% after multiple companies placed mines into care-and-maintenance status owing to low prices", and in the Philippines production "declined by an estimated 24% after multiple mines reported production cuts".

      Published
      2026-02
      Evidence period
      2024, with 2025 estimated
      Geography
      World, reported by country of mine production
      Limitations
      Mine production and reserves only. It does not cover smelting, refining, downstream investment or who owns the capacity, the 2025 figures are estimates, and it reports quantities rather than the environmental, labour or revenue effects of where the mining happens.
  4. Build Resilient Interdependence

    How do leaders preserve the benefits of connected systems while preventing connection from becoming fragility?

    Connection is the region's advantage and its exposure. The leadership question is which redundancies are worth their cost.

    4P: Process, Planet, PortfolioSDGs: 9, 11, 17

    Rests on: Interdependence creates efficiency and vulnerability simultaneously

    • Source ASEAN Single Window (2022)

      About ASEAN Single Window

      The ASEAN Single Window connects the National Single Windows of ASEAN Member States so that trade documents are submitted once and processed once for customs clearance. "The ratification of the Protocol on the Legal Framework to Implement the ASW (PLF) has enabled the live operation of the ASW among ASEAN Member States. In 2021, AMS have exchanged more than 900,000 of the ATIGA e-Form D through ASW." Other documents were being added one at a time: the ASEAN Customs Declaration Document exchange "started since December 2020 among Cambodia, Myanmar, and Singapore", with Malaysia and Thailand joining in 2021 and the Philippines in January 2022.

      Published
      2022 (undated page whose status text stops in 2022, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      2020 to 2022
      Geography
      The ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      Published by the programme itself, so it reports its own progress. It counts documents exchanged rather than trade outcomes, says nothing about cost to run or about the traders who cannot use it, and its status text stops in 2022, so it is not evidence of current volumes. This record was read on the programme's own website on 2026-09-19. That website has since appeared in search indexes under unrelated gambling titles, so the link now points to ASEAN's official Single Window page on asean.org, which describes the same programme but does not carry the 2021 figure quoted here.
    • Source AHA Centre, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (2026)

      About us

      The AHA Centre is "an intergovernmental organisation, established by the ten ASEAN Member States with the aim to facilitate cooperation and coordination of disaster management amongst ASEAN Member States", created by an agreement signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on November 17, 2011. It works primarily with the National Disaster Management Organisations of the Member States, reports to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management, whose members serve as its Governing Board, and is affirmed as "the primary ASEAN regional coordinating agency on disaster management and emergency response" by the One ASEAN One Response declaration and ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management.

      Published
      2026 (undated page, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      2011 to 2026
      Geography
      The ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      The Centre's own account of its mandate, not an evaluation of how it performed in any particular emergency. The page is internally inconsistent about membership, referring to both ten and eleven Member States, and it carries no publication date.

Tensions Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

What trade-offs must they navigate?

These are to investigate, not to resolve on a slide. Each side of a tension is a legitimate demand.

  • Speed and renewal

    The pace that delivers results leaves no slack for rebuilding the system that delivers them, and renewal always costs current output.

    Meeting today's targets is a real obligation to real people. So is arriving at the next decade with a system that still works.

    • Source World Bank (2026)

      Viet Nam Overview

      Reforms since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986 "helped transform Viet Nam from one of the world's poorest countries to a dynamic middle-income economy", with GDP per capita rising "from under $700 (1986) to nearly $4,500 (2023)" and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent, making it "one of the world's most open, trade-oriented economies". Reaching high-income status by 2045 requires it to "accelerate productivity, strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms, expand access to finance and technology for SMEs", against "rising challenges, including an aging population, global trade shifts, rapid automation, and climate risks".

      Published
      2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      1986 to 2023
      Geography
      Viet Nam
      Limitations
      A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.
View the other 4 tensions
  • Efficiency and resilience

    Concentration and lean networks lower costs; redundancy and diversification raise them and are only visibly worth it after a shock.

    Competitive cost is what keeps industries and jobs in the region. Redundancy is what keeps them there after a disruption.

    • Source U.S. Geological Survey (2026)

      Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Nickel

      Indonesia mined 2,310,000 tons of nickel in 2024 and an estimated 2,600,000 tons in 2025, against world totals of 3,710,000 and an estimated 3,900,000 tons: roughly 62 percent of world mine production rising to roughly 67 percent, on reserves of 62,000,000 tons. Over the same period, "Production in Australia decreased by an estimated 54% after multiple companies placed mines into care-and-maintenance status owing to low prices", and in the Philippines production "declined by an estimated 24% after multiple mines reported production cuts".

      Published
      2026-02
      Evidence period
      2024, with 2025 estimated
      Geography
      World, reported by country of mine production
      Limitations
      Mine production and reserves only. It does not cover smelting, refining, downstream investment or who owns the capacity, the 2025 figures are estimates, and it reports quantities rather than the environmental, labour or revenue effects of where the mining happens.
  • Automation and participation

    Automation answers contracting workforces and rising costs; it also removes the entry-level work through which young workers enter the economy.

    Firms facing labour shortage and cost pressure are right to automate. Economies with young populations are right to protect the paths into work.

  • National control and regional interoperability

    Connected customs, digital, energy and data systems require common rules, and every common rule narrows what a government can decide alone.

    Sovereign authority over national systems is legitimate. So is the capability that only exists when those systems interoperate.

    • Source ASEAN Single Window (2022)

      About ASEAN Single Window

      The ASEAN Single Window connects the National Single Windows of ASEAN Member States so that trade documents are submitted once and processed once for customs clearance. "The ratification of the Protocol on the Legal Framework to Implement the ASW (PLF) has enabled the live operation of the ASW among ASEAN Member States. In 2021, AMS have exchanged more than 900,000 of the ATIGA e-Form D through ASW." Other documents were being added one at a time: the ASEAN Customs Declaration Document exchange "started since December 2020 among Cambodia, Myanmar, and Singapore", with Malaysia and Thailand joining in 2021 and the Philippines in January 2022.

      Published
      2022 (undated page whose status text stops in 2022, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      2020 to 2022
      Geography
      The ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      Published by the programme itself, so it reports its own progress. It counts documents exchanged rather than trade outcomes, says nothing about cost to run or about the traders who cannot use it, and its status text stops in 2022, so it is not evidence of current volumes. This record was read on the programme's own website on 2026-09-19. That website has since appeared in search indexes under unrelated gambling titles, so the link now points to ASEAN's official Single Window page on asean.org, which describes the same programme but does not carry the 2021 figure quoted here.
  • Present competitiveness and future transition

    The industries that fund the transition are often the ones the transition must change, and moving first can cost the market share that pays for moving at all.

    Protecting current competitiveness protects livelihoods now. Transforming early protects the ability to compete later.

    • Source Energy Market Authority, Singapore (2024)

      Singapore Doubles Power Import Capacity Under LTMS-PIP Phase 2

      "Phase Two of the LTMS-PIP will see electricity traded increase from up to 100 megawatts (MW) to a maximum of 200 MW. This is made possible by the introduction of multidirectional power trade under which additional supply will come from Malaysia." The project "was launched on 23 June 2022 and marked the first collaboration among four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states on multilateral cross-border electricity trading of renewable energy." The regulator's chief executive describes the enhancement as bringing the region "closer to achieving the vision of the ASEAN Power Grid", which is therefore not presented as achieved.

      Published
      2024-09-20
      Evidence period
      June 2022 to 2026
      Geography
      Lao PDR, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore
      Limitations
      A media release from one participating government's regulator, announcing a licence extension. It reports traded capacity rather than delivered energy, and says nothing about price, utilisation, or the rest of the ASEAN Power Grid's planned interconnections.
    • Source U.S. Geological Survey (2026)

      Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Nickel

      Indonesia mined 2,310,000 tons of nickel in 2024 and an estimated 2,600,000 tons in 2025, against world totals of 3,710,000 and an estimated 3,900,000 tons: roughly 62 percent of world mine production rising to roughly 67 percent, on reserves of 62,000,000 tons. Over the same period, "Production in Australia decreased by an estimated 54% after multiple companies placed mines into care-and-maintenance status owing to low prices", and in the Philippines production "declined by an estimated 24% after multiple mines reported production cuts".

      Published
      2026-02
      Evidence period
      2024, with 2025 estimated
      Geography
      World, reported by country of mine production
      Limitations
      Mine production and reserves only. It does not cover smelting, refining, downstream investment or who owns the capacity, the 2025 figures are estimates, and it reports quantities rather than the environmental, labour or revenue effects of where the mining happens.

Regional responses and experiments

What is being tried

Every response is classified as established, promising, early, contested, failed, and documented with the Response Case Protocol: Attempt → Conditions → Mechanism → Evidence → Outcome → For whom → Cost / trade-off → Unintended effects → Transferability.

ASEAN Single Window Established / continuing
Attempt
Connect the national customs systems of ASEAN Member States so trade documents are submitted once, processed once, and accepted across borders.
Conditions
Ten national customs regimes, each sovereign, each with its own systems, facing trade volumes that paper clearance could not carry.
Mechanism
A legal protocol plus shared technical architecture: national systems stay national and exchange documents with each other, rather than being replaced by a regional system.
Evidence
Live operation among Member States following ratification of the Protocol on the Legal Framework, with more than 900,000 ATIGA e-Form D certificates exchanged in 2021, and further document types added one at a time from December 2020 onward. From 1 January 2024 Member States fully implemented issuance and acceptance of the e-Form D through the ASW, with paper forms only where technical issues arise. No official volume figure more recent than 2021 was verified, so the 2021 count is historical, not current.
Outcome
Established and continuing. It shows interoperability working without any transfer of sovereignty, and it also shows the pace: each new document type is a separate negotiation, and the published figures count exchanges, not trade outcomes.
For whom
Traders and customs authorities across the Member States. Smaller traders benefit only where they can meet the documentary requirements at all.
Cost / trade-off
Each participating state carries the cost of building and maintaining its national system, and each new document type is negotiated separately, which is slow.
Unintended effects
Not established from the material reviewed. The published figures count document exchanges, so any effect on who can trade is not visible in them.
Transferability
The interoperability pattern travels further than the technology: connect sovereign systems, do not merge them.
  • Source ASEAN Single Window (2022)

    About ASEAN Single Window

    The ASEAN Single Window connects the National Single Windows of ASEAN Member States so that trade documents are submitted once and processed once for customs clearance. "The ratification of the Protocol on the Legal Framework to Implement the ASW (PLF) has enabled the live operation of the ASW among ASEAN Member States. In 2021, AMS have exchanged more than 900,000 of the ATIGA e-Form D through ASW." Other documents were being added one at a time: the ASEAN Customs Declaration Document exchange "started since December 2020 among Cambodia, Myanmar, and Singapore", with Malaysia and Thailand joining in 2021 and the Philippines in January 2022.

    Published
    2022 (undated page whose status text stops in 2022, accessed 2026-09-19)
    Evidence period
    2020 to 2022
    Geography
    The ASEAN Member States
    Limitations
    Published by the programme itself, so it reports its own progress. It counts documents exchanged rather than trade outcomes, says nothing about cost to run or about the traders who cannot use it, and its status text stops in 2022, so it is not evidence of current volumes. This record was read on the programme's own website on 2026-09-19. That website has since appeared in search indexes under unrelated gambling titles, so the link now points to ASEAN's official Single Window page on asean.org, which describes the same programme but does not carry the 2021 figure quoted here.
  • Source ASEAN Secretariat (2024)

    ASEAN Fully Implement e-Form D through the ASEAN Single Window

    "ASEAN Member States started fully implementing the issuance and acceptance of e-Form D through the ASEAN Single Window (ASW) on 1 January 2024. From now on, hard copies of Form D will only be issued and accepted when technical issues are taken place."

    Published
    2024-01-01
    Evidence period
    From 1 January 2024
    Geography
    ASEAN Member States
    Limitations
    An announcement of full implementation. It reports no volumes, and establishes nothing about trade growth, clearance times, costs, or which traders can use the system.
ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement Emerging / implementation transition
Attempt
Extend the region's coordination model to the digital economy: cross-border data, digital trade, payments, identity and rules that let digital systems work across ten jurisdictions.
Conditions
Digital adoption running far ahead of the rules governing it, with national frameworks diverging as they are written.
Mechanism
A negotiated regional framework agreement, intended to set common terms while national authority over digital policy remains national.
Evidence
Negotiations concluded at the 57th ASEAN SEOM in Manila on 27-29 May 2026, announced as the conclusion of ASEAN's first region-wide digital economy agreement. In July 2026 foreign ministers still looked forward to signing it in November 2026. The agreement is concluded, not signed, ratified or in force, and the projection that it could double the digital economy's value by 2030 is attributed to studies the statement does not name.
Outcome
Emerging: negotiations are concluded and signature is scheduled, and implementation has not begun. Outcomes are not claimed here, because none are yet evidenced: what exists is a framework, and the question the movement will put to it is what it has actually changed.
For whom
Firms and users operating digitally across borders, and the national authorities writing digital rules.
Cost / trade-off
Common terms narrow what each government can decide alone, which is the price of systems that work across the region.
Unintended effects
Not established. Nothing is claimed here about outcomes, because none are yet evidenced.
  • Source ASEAN Secretariat (Chairperson of the ASEAN SEOM, ASEAN Philippines 2026) (2026)

    Statement of the Chairperson of the ASEAN Senior Economic Officials (SEOM) on the Conclusion of ASEAN DEFA Negotiations

    ASEAN SEOM "successfully resolved all outstanding issues in the negotiations of the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA)" in Manila on 27-29 May 2026, marking the conclusion of negotiations on ASEAN's first region-wide digital economy agreement, and "looks forward to the signing of the ASEAN DEFA in November 2026".

    Published
    2026-05-30
    Evidence period
    Negotiations concluded at the Second Meeting of the 57th ASEAN SEOM, Manila, 27-29 May 2026
    Geography
    ASEAN Member States
    Limitations
    An official statement announcing that negotiations concluded. Concluding negotiations is not signature, ratification, entry into force or implementation, and the statement itself says signing is expected in November 2026. Its projection that the digital economy could double to USD 2 trillion by 2030 is conditional and attributed to studies it does not name. It establishes no outcome of any kind.
  • Source ASEAN Secretariat (2026)

    Joint Communique of the 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting

    Paragraph 90: "We welcomed the conclusion of the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) text negotiations and looked forward to its signing at the sidelines of the 49th ASEAN Summit in November 2026."

    Published
    2026-07-21
    Evidence period
    Position as at 21 July 2026
    Geography
    ASEAN Member States
    Limitations
    A negotiated communique. On DEFA it records that text negotiations have concluded and that signing is still ahead; it establishes nothing about implementation or effect.
Explore all cases (7 more)
ASEAN Power Grid, through the Lao PDR, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore integration project Long-running / incomplete
Attempt
Build a regional electricity grid that lets power move between ASEAN countries, so that surplus generation in one country can serve demand in another.
Conditions
Rising demand, uneven generation resources, national grids built to national specifications, and no regional market to trade across.
Mechanism
Bilateral and multilateral trading arrangements layered onto existing interconnectors, starting with one four-country corridor rather than a region-wide market.
Evidence
The four-country project launched in June 2022 as the first multilateral cross-border electricity trade among ASEAN members, with traded capacity of up to 100 MW; its second phase raises the maximum to 200 MW and introduces multidirectional trade with supply from Malaysia. These are capacity limits, not energy delivered. Singapore's regulator describes this as bringing the region closer to the vision of the ASEAN Power Grid.
Outcome
Long-running and incomplete, and it is not presented as a completed success. Decades after the concept, the flagship corridor is licensed to trade up to 200 MW. No attached source reports how much energy it has delivered, at what price or utilisation, or how that capacity compares with total ASEAN demand. What it demonstrates is that multilateral power trade is technically and institutionally possible; what it does not demonstrate is a regional grid.
For whom
Electricity systems and consumers in the four participating countries, and the exporting country's generation sector.
Cost / trade-off
Trading capacity runs on existing interconnectors, which keeps cost down and keeps capacity limited. What a genuine regional market would require in new investment is not evidenced here.
Unintended effects
Not established from this source, which reports capacity rather than delivered energy, price or effects on national systems.
Transferability
The corridor approach, one workable route before a regional market, is the transferable part.
  • Source Energy Market Authority, Singapore (2024)

    Singapore Doubles Power Import Capacity Under LTMS-PIP Phase 2

    "Phase Two of the LTMS-PIP will see electricity traded increase from up to 100 megawatts (MW) to a maximum of 200 MW. This is made possible by the introduction of multidirectional power trade under which additional supply will come from Malaysia." The project "was launched on 23 June 2022 and marked the first collaboration among four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states on multilateral cross-border electricity trading of renewable energy." The regulator's chief executive describes the enhancement as bringing the region "closer to achieving the vision of the ASEAN Power Grid", which is therefore not presented as achieved.

    Published
    2024-09-20
    Evidence period
    June 2022 to 2026
    Geography
    Lao PDR, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore
    Limitations
    A media release from one participating government's regulator, announcing a licence extension. It reports traded capacity rather than delivered energy, and says nothing about price, utilisation, or the rest of the ASEAN Power Grid's planned interconnections.
Singapore's AI governance testing frameworks Established framework / evolving practice
Attempt
Give organisations a practical way to test and demonstrate that an AI system behaves as claimed, including as systems become more agentic.
Conditions
Deployment moving faster than regulation, with governance frameworks that were principles rather than anything an organisation could run against a system.
Mechanism
Testing and assurance tooling plus published governance frameworks, voluntary rather than statutory, intended to be usable by organisations and checkable by others.
Evidence
Singapore's AI Verify testing framework and toolkit was launched in May 2022, open-sourced in June 2023 and updated for generative AI in May 2025, and Project Moonshot adds open-source benchmarking and red teaming for LLM applications. The Global AI Assurance Pilot, launched in February 2025, matched 17 deployers of generative AI applications with 16 specialist testing firms across 10 industries, and found that risk depends heavily on the context of use. These are tools and a voluntary pilot of self-selected participants: how widely the tools are adopted, and any effect on how AI systems behave, are not established, and none of it is evidence about AI governance elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
Outcome
An established framework with evolving practice. It is a small, high-capacity jurisdiction's answer to the governance gap, and Singapore is not a proxy for Southeast Asia: what transfers is the approach, not the administrative capacity that produced it.
For whom
Organisations deploying AI systems, and the people affected by those systems where testing is actually applied.
Cost / trade-off
Voluntary testing is adoptable without legislation, and is only as strong as the incentive to use it.
Unintended effects
Not established. A framework from a high-capacity jurisdiction can set an expectation that neighbouring administrations cannot resource.
Transferability
Testable assurance is the idea worth moving; the institutional capacity behind it is not automatically available elsewhere.
  • Source AI Verify Foundation (2026)

    What is AI Verify

    A testing framework and software toolkit to assess responsible implementation of an AI system against 11 internationally recognised AI governance principles, launched by IMDA and PDPC as a minimum viable product on 25 May 2022, open-sourced on 7 June 2023, and updated for generative AI on 29 May 2025.

    Published
    2026 (undated page, read 2026-09-21)
    Evidence period
    May 2022 to May 2025
    Geography
    Singapore
    Limitations
    A description of a tool by the body that maintains it. It establishes what the framework is and when it was released, not how many organisations use it, what testing found, or any effect on how AI systems behave.
  • Source AI Verify Foundation (2026)

    Project Moonshot

    "An open-source tool to bring benchmarking and red teaming together to help LLM App developers and compliance teams to test and evaluate their LLMs and LLM applications."

    Published
    2026 (undated page, read 2026-09-21)
    Evidence period
    Tool as described in 2026
    Geography
    Singapore
    Limitations
    A tool description. It establishes that the tool exists and what it is for, not its use, findings or effect.
  • Source AI Verify Foundation, with its parent the Infocomm Media Development Authority of Singapore (IMDA) (2025)

    Testing Real-World Generative AI Systems: Global AI Assurance Pilot main report

    "The pilot matched 17 deployers of GenAI applications with 16 specialist AI testing firms", based in Singapore and eight other geographies, across 10 industries including banking, healthcare and technology. It found that "risk assessments depend heavily on the context of the use case".

    Published
    2025 (no date stated in the report; file published in June 2025)
    Evidence period
    Pilot launched February 2025
    Geography
    Singapore, with participating organisations from eight other geographies
    Limitations
    A practitioner report on a voluntary pilot of 17 self-selected applications. It reports lessons about how to test, not measured safety or effectiveness of the applications, and not how widely such testing is used. Participation is not adoption, and one high-capacity jurisdiction's pilot is not evidence about AI governance across Southeast Asia.
Vietnam's global value chain upgrading Established success facing next-stage constraint
Attempt
Move from low-cost assembly into deeper participation in global production networks, with rising incomes as the result.
Conditions
A low-income starting point in 1986, an open trade position, and foreign investment willing to locate production.
Mechanism
Sustained economic reform, trade openness and investment attraction, building manufacturing employment at scale.
Evidence
Reform since 1986 transformed the country from one of the world's poorest into a middle-income economy, with GDP per capita rising from under US$700 to nearly US$4,500 by 2023 and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent.
Outcome
An established success now facing its next-stage constraint. The same account names what the next stage requires: faster productivity growth, stronger linkages between domestic and foreign firms, and finance and technology reaching smaller firms, against ageing, automation, shifting trade and climate risk. In LEAD48's reading, the model that produced the first transformation is not by itself the one that produces the second; the source names what the next stage requires but does not say the earlier model cannot deliver it.
For whom
Workers who entered manufacturing employment, and the domestic firms positioned to supply it.
Cost / trade-off
LEAD48 interpretation rather than a finding of the attached source: openness attracted production quickly, and the World Bank's call to strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms suggests value has not spread evenly between them. The source does not measure where value is concentrated.
Unintended effects
Not established from this source. It names ageing, automation, trade shifts and climate risk as pressures on the model rather than as effects of it.
Transferability
As a LEAD48 interpretation, the constraint transfers more usefully than the success: openness attracts production, and linkages are what convert it. No claim is made that other economies in the region follow the same sequence.
  • Source World Bank (2026)

    Viet Nam Overview

    Reforms since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986 "helped transform Viet Nam from one of the world's poorest countries to a dynamic middle-income economy", with GDP per capita rising "from under $700 (1986) to nearly $4,500 (2023)" and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent, making it "one of the world's most open, trade-oriented economies". Reaching high-income status by 2045 requires it to "accelerate productivity, strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms, expand access to finance and technology for SMEs", against "rising challenges, including an aging population, global trade shifts, rapid automation, and climate risks".

    Published
    2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19)
    Evidence period
    1986 to 2023
    Geography
    Viet Nam
    Limitations
    A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.
Indonesia's nickel downstreaming and clean-energy supply chains Transformative / contested
Attempt
Capture more of the value of a critical mineral at home by requiring processing in-country rather than exporting raw ore.
Conditions
Large reserves, raw-ore exports before the 2020 prohibition, and rising global demand for battery and stainless steel inputs.
Mechanism
A prohibition on exporting nickel ore below 1.7 per cent grade from 1 January 2020, and a domestic processing requirement for all nickel ore. A WTO panel found both inconsistent with GATT Article XI:1 in November 2022, a finding Indonesia has appealed into an Appellate Body that is not operating. The investment in processing capacity that followed is not evidenced by the sources attached here.
Evidence
Indonesia mined 2,310,000 tons of nickel in 2024 and an estimated 2,600,000 tons in 2025, against world totals of 3,710,000 and an estimated 3,900,000 tons: about 62.3 percent of world mine production in 2024 and an estimated 66.7 percent in 2025. USGS estimates that Australian production fell by 54 percent as companies placed mines into care and maintenance owing to low prices, and that Philippine production fell by 24 percent after production cuts. The export prohibition and processing requirement are documented separately, by Indonesia's energy ministry and the WTO dispute record.
Outcome
Transformative and contested, and both belong in the record. It coincided with one country becoming the dominant source of a transition-critical mineral's mine production; how much processing moved onshore, and what value that captured, is not evidenced by the sources attached here. It also concentrates global mine supply in one place, and it raises unresolved questions about the energy used for processing, environmental and community effects at the mine sites, who owns the investment, how the revenue is shared, and what a price collapse does to producers elsewhere.
For whom
The national economy and the workforce in processing regions. Mining communities and producers in other countries may carry effects they did not choose; those effects are not measured here.
Cost / trade-off
Any value captured at home is weighed against energy use, environmental load and dependence on one commodity's price. None of these is measured by the sources attached here, so the trade-off is named rather than settled.
Unintended effects
Mine supply concentrated in one country. USGS attributes the estimated fall in Australian production to low prices; it does not attribute that price level, or closures elsewhere, to Indonesian policy, and no causal link is claimed here. The environmental and community effects are named in the gap register, not evidenced here.
Transferability
The industrial-policy logic travels; so do its costs, and both should travel together.
  • Source U.S. Geological Survey (2026)

    Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Nickel

    Indonesia mined 2,310,000 tons of nickel in 2024 and an estimated 2,600,000 tons in 2025, against world totals of 3,710,000 and an estimated 3,900,000 tons: roughly 62 percent of world mine production rising to roughly 67 percent, on reserves of 62,000,000 tons. Over the same period, "Production in Australia decreased by an estimated 54% after multiple companies placed mines into care-and-maintenance status owing to low prices", and in the Philippines production "declined by an estimated 24% after multiple mines reported production cuts".

    Published
    2026-02
    Evidence period
    2024, with 2025 estimated
    Geography
    World, reported by country of mine production
    Limitations
    Mine production and reserves only. It does not cover smelting, refining, downstream investment or who owns the capacity, the 2025 figures are estimates, and it reports quantities rather than the environmental, labour or revenue effects of where the mining happens.
  • Source Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Republic of Indonesia (ESDM), press release 549.Pers/04/SJI/2019 (2019)

    Bijih Nikel Tidak Boleh Diekspor Lagi per Januari 2020 (Nickel ore may no longer be exported from January 2020)

    "Terhitung mulai 1 Januari 2020 bijih nikel dengan kadar di bawah 1,7% tidak lagi diperbolehkan untuk diekspor": from 1 January 2020, nickel ore below 1.7 per cent grade may no longer be exported.

    Published
    2019-09-02
    Evidence period
    Announced 2019; effective 1 January 2020
    Geography
    Indonesia
    Limitations
    An announcement of a future ban, not evidence of how it was enforced or what it achieved. It establishes nothing about downstream investment, value capture, ownership, revenue sharing or effects on communities or producers elsewhere.
  • Source World Trade Organization (2022)

    DS592: Indonesia, Measures Relating to Raw Materials

    The European Union challenged "(a) a prohibition on the exportation of nickel ore and; (b) a domestic processing requirement (DPR) for all nickel ore". The panel report, circulated on 30 November 2022, found both "inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994", and Indonesia notified its appeal on 8 December 2022.

    Published
    2022-11-30 (panel report circulated)
    Evidence period
    Consultations requested November 2019 to appeal notified December 2022
    Geography
    Indonesia
    Limitations
    A dispute record. It establishes the measures and the panel's legal finding; Indonesia appealed into an Appellate Body that is not operating, so the finding is not final. It establishes nothing about value captured by domestic processing, who owns the processing capacity, revenue, processing energy, or labour, environmental or community effects.
AHA Centre regional disaster response Established regional capability
Attempt
Coordinate disaster response across ASEAN so that regional capability reaches an affected country faster than bilateral arrangements can be assembled.
Conditions
Recurring large-scale disasters across a region of sovereign states with very different national response capacities.
Mechanism
An intergovernmental centre working through national disaster management organisations, governed by the member states' own disaster management committee, with a standing mandate rather than case-by-case agreement.
Evidence
Established by agreement signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers in November 2011, working primarily with national disaster management organisations, and affirmed as the primary ASEAN regional coordinating agency for disaster management and emergency response under One ASEAN One Response and ASEAN Vision 2025. Its self-reported 2024 annual report counts 422 trained responders and more than USD 2 million in relief deployed. The 2011 agreement was made among the ten member states of that time; Timor-Leste was admitted as ASEAN's eleventh member in October 2025, which is why the Centre's own page refers to both ten and eleven.
Outcome
An established regional capability, meaning a standing mandate that does not wait for a crisis to be organised. The evidence separates what can be separated: the mandate and the standing capability are established; activations and outputs are self-reported by the Centre; outcomes for affected people and effectiveness, including response speed and comparison with alternatives, are not evaluated in any attached source. That is a gap in this brief rather than a finding about the institution.
For whom
Affected populations and the national disaster management organisations that request support.
Cost / trade-off
A standing regional mandate costs member states sustained funding for capability that is idle between emergencies.
Unintended effects
Not established. The Centre's own account does not evaluate performance in any specific emergency.
Transferability
A standing mandate held between states, rather than assembled per disaster, is the transferable mechanism.
  • Source AHA Centre, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (2026)

    About us

    The AHA Centre is "an intergovernmental organisation, established by the ten ASEAN Member States with the aim to facilitate cooperation and coordination of disaster management amongst ASEAN Member States", created by an agreement signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on November 17, 2011. It works primarily with the National Disaster Management Organisations of the Member States, reports to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management, whose members serve as its Governing Board, and is affirmed as "the primary ASEAN regional coordinating agency on disaster management and emergency response" by the One ASEAN One Response declaration and ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management.

    Published
    2026 (undated page, accessed 2026-09-19)
    Evidence period
    2011 to 2026
    Geography
    The ASEAN Member States
    Limitations
    The Centre's own account of its mandate, not an evaluation of how it performed in any particular emergency. The page is internally inconsistent about membership, referring to both ten and eleven Member States, and it carries no publication date.
  • Source AHA Centre, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (2025)

    The AHA Centre Annual Report 2024

    The Centre reports "422 trained responders" and more than USD 2 million in relief deployed in 2024, and describes its response to Tropical Cyclone Yagi as its second-largest coordinated response in the past decade, after the 2018 Central Sulawesi earthquake.

    Published
    2025
    Evidence period
    2024
    Geography
    ASEAN Member States
    Limitations
    Self-reported by the Centre. It counts activity and outputs, such as responders trained and relief deployed, not outcomes: it reports no response times and no count of people the Centre's assistance reached, and its figure of more than 5 million people affected counts people affected by the disasters, not people helped. It is not an independent or comparative evaluation.
  • Source ASEAN Secretariat (ASEAN Malaysia 2025) (2025)

    Chairman's Statement of the 47th ASEAN Summit

    "We welcomed the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste as the 11th Member State of ASEAN" at the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025.

    Published
    2025-10-26
    Evidence period
    47th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 2025
    Geography
    ASEAN Member States
    Limitations
    A chairman's statement. It establishes Timor-Leste's admission as a member; it also records that Timor-Leste still has roadmap criteria to implement, and it says nothing about any ASEAN body's performance.
Korea's workforce and pension adaptation Active reform under demographic pressure
Attempt
Adjust pension financing and workforce policy to a population that is ageing and contracting faster than the systems built around it assumed.
Conditions
One of the world's lowest fertility rates, rapid ageing, and a pension system designed for a different demographic structure.
Mechanism
Contribution and benefit reform. The retirement-age, employment and participation measures the demographic pressure also calls for are not part of what was legislated.
Evidence
The National Pension Act amendment passed on 20 March 2025 and applies from 1 January 2026: contributions rise by 0.5 percentage points a year to reach 13 per cent in 2033, and the nominal income replacement rate rises to 43 per cent. An automatic adjustment mechanism was not legislated and was deferred to a special committee, and neither the pension age nor the retirement age changed. Projected fund depletion depends on the assumptions used: the government puts it at 2071 if fund returns also rise by a percentage point, the OECD at 2065. Fertility was 0.72 in 2023, 0.75 in 2024 and 0.80 in 2025 on preliminary figures.
Outcome
Active reform under demographic pressure. It is reform in progress, not a solved problem: the demographic challenge is not implied here to be answered, and the movement should treat this as a case of adjusting a system while the pressure is still building.
For whom
Current contributors, current and future pensioners, and employers carrying the contribution.
Cost / trade-off
Adjusting earlier spreads the cost over more people and asks today's workers to carry a change whose benefit is decades away.
Unintended effects
Not established in this cycle.
Transferability
The sequencing question, how much to change before the pressure is undeniable, is what other ageing economies can use.
  • Source Ministry of Health and Welfare and Ministry of Economy and Finance, Republic of Korea (Korea.kr policy briefing) (2025)

    '연금개혁법안' 국회 통과, 내년 시행 (Pension reform bill passes the National Assembly, in force next year)

    The National Pension Act amendment passed the National Assembly on 20 March 2025 and applies from 1 January 2026: the contribution rate rises by 0.5 percentage points a year from 2026 to reach 13 per cent in 2033, and the nominal income replacement rate rises to 43 per cent from 2026.

    Published
    2025-03-20
    Evidence period
    Legislated 20 March 2025; in force from 1 January 2026; contribution path to 2033
    Geography
    Republic of Korea
    Limitations
    The government's own account of legislation. It establishes what was legislated, not its effect. An automatic adjustment mechanism was not legislated and was deferred to the National Assembly's special committee on structural reform, and no change to the pension age or the retirement age was made. Its projection that fund depletion moves from 2056 to 2071 depends on fund returns also rising by one percentage point.
  • Source OECD (2025)

    Pensions at a Glance 2025: Korea country note

    The accrual rate rises from 1.0 to 1.075 per cent; before the reform the fund was projected to run a deficit from 2041 and be depleted by 2057, and after it a deficit from 2048 and depletion by 2065.

    Published
    2025-11
    Evidence period
    Rules in force after the 2025 reform; projections to the 2060s
    Geography
    Republic of Korea
    Limitations
    An independent international summary. Its fund projections are projections, on assumptions that differ from the Korean government's, which is why the two give different depletion years.
  • Source Ministry of Data and Statistics, Republic of Korea (formerly Statistics Korea) (2026)

    Preliminary Results of Birth and Death Statistics in 2025

    The total fertility rate was 0.72 in 2023 and 0.75 in 2024, and "marked 0.80 in 2025" on preliminary figures; deaths (363.4 thousand) exceeded births (254.5 thousand) by about 110 thousand.

    Published
    2026-02-25
    Evidence period
    2023 to 2025; 2025 preliminary
    Geography
    Republic of Korea
    Limitations
    Preliminary figures for 2025. It measures births, deaths and fertility, not the age structure, working-age population, labour-force participation or care demand, and a one-year rise in fertility is not a reversal of the trend.
Southeast Asian clean-energy manufacturing and grid transition Rapid progress / unresolved system transition
Attempt
Build clean-energy manufacturing capacity and deploy renewable generation while the grids, storage and market arrangements around them are still being built.
Conditions
Fast-rising demand, industrial systems dependent on reliable and affordable power, and grids designed for centralised dispatchable generation.
Mechanism
Manufacturing investment and deployment targets, ahead of the grid, storage, finance and market reform that would let the generation be fully used.
Evidence
Held as separate measures, not fused into one regional claim. Manufacturing: Southeast Asia had 106 GW of solar PV module manufacturing capacity at the end of 2023, and Viet Nam, Thailand and Malaysia were the world's largest solar PV manufacturers after China; that is capacity, not production. Installed generation: on-grid renewable capacity at the end of 2025 was about 50.6 GW in Viet Nam, 15.6 GW in Thailand, 10.3 GW in the Philippines, 10.4 GW in Indonesia and 9.7 GW in Malaysia; that is capacity, not delivered electricity. Grids: in Viet Nam the renewable boom was not matched by transmission investment, which led to curtailment, but no official curtailment volume is published for any country. Investment: clean energy drew around USD 32 billion of just over USD 70 billion of energy investment in 2023. Storage and delivered electricity are not evidenced here.
Outcome
Rapid progress with an unresolved system transition. Generation and manufacturing have moved faster than the grids, storage and market rules that determine whether the electricity is actually delivered, which is the part the region has not yet solved.
For whom
Industrial users and households needing affordable, reliable power, and the workforces in new manufacturing capacity.
Cost / trade-off
Generation and manufacturing can be built quickly; grids, storage and market reform cannot, and the mismatch is paid for in unusable capacity.
Unintended effects
Curtailment is documented in Viet Nam, and named as a risk in Thailand and Indonesia, but not measured in any attached source. Stranded capacity and price effects remain open questions.
Transferability
The lesson is the sequencing failure to avoid: generation without grid and storage produces announcements rather than power.
  • Source International Energy Agency (IEA) (2024)

    Southeast Asia Energy Outlook 2024 (World Energy Outlook Special Report)

    "At the end of 2023, Southeast Asia had 106 GW solar PV module manufacturing capacity", and Viet Nam, Thailand and Malaysia were the world's largest solar PV manufacturers after China. Clean energy drew around USD 32 billion of just over USD 70 billion in energy investment in 2023, only 2 per cent of global clean energy spending. In Viet Nam, "the renewable deployment boom was not matched with increased investment in transmission", which "led to curtailment and a slowdown of new investment".

    Published
    2024-10
    Evidence period
    End of 2023, with scenario projections to 2035 and 2050
    Geography
    The ten ASEAN member states in 2024
    Limitations
    IEA analysis drawing on commercial data inputs. Manufacturing figures are capacity, not production, and the plants are largely owned by Chinese companies. Its 2024 investment figure is described as an estimate, and all figures after 2024 are scenario projections. It gives no measured curtailment volume for any country.
  • Source International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (2026)

    IRENASTAT: Electricity capacity statistics (2026 H1 dataset)

    Installed on-grid renewable capacity at the end of 2025 was about 50,604 MW in Viet Nam, 15,632 MW in Thailand, 10,343 MW in the Philippines, 10,398 MW in Indonesia and 9,746 MW in Malaysia.

    Published
    2026 (queried from IRENASTAT on 2026-09-21)
    Evidence period
    End of 2025
    Geography
    Viet Nam, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, each separately
    Limitations
    Installed capacity, not electricity generated or delivered, capacity factors or curtailment. Malaysia's 2025 values are identical to 2024 and may be carried forward. IRENA's capacity accounting differs from IEA modelling, so the two sets of figures should not be combined.
  • Source International Energy Agency (IEA) (2025)

    Integrating Solar and Wind in Southeast Asia

    In Viet Nam, feed-in tariffs took solar and wind from less than 1 per cent of generation before 2019 to around 15 per cent in 2022, which exposed challenges in grid congestion, curtailment and system planning; Thailand, Indonesia and Viet Nam face contractual obligations that can lead to uneconomic curtailment of variable renewables.

    Published
    2025-09
    Evidence period
    2019 to 2025
    Geography
    Southeast Asia, with country detail for Viet Nam, Thailand and Indonesia
    Limitations
    Qualitative on curtailment: it names curtailment and grid congestion as consequences but reports no measured curtailment volume or rate for any country.

Leadership interpretation

Through the LEAD48 4P Leadership Lens

The region remains the subject. The 4Ps help interpret what the evidence means for leadership.

What the evidence asks us to examine

People renew capability. Process coordinates speed. Planet exposes limits. Portfolio chooses what must change before failure forces it. Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme
How each P reads in this region

People

Who carries the consequences?

Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

The evidence asks Who renews the capability this region runs on, and who is left to adapt alone?

People renew capability. The region's skills, care work, youth cohorts, ageing workforces, migrant labour and firm-level know-how are what technological and industrial change actually runs through. Workforce adaptation is not a consequence of the transition, it is the mechanism of it: where skills, participation and mobility are organised well, renewal is possible, and where they are not, the technology arrives without the benefit.

  • Source World Bank (2026)

    Viet Nam Overview

    Reforms since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986 "helped transform Viet Nam from one of the world's poorest countries to a dynamic middle-income economy", with GDP per capita rising "from under $700 (1986) to nearly $4,500 (2023)" and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent, making it "one of the world's most open, trade-oriented economies". Reaching high-income status by 2045 requires it to "accelerate productivity, strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms, expand access to finance and technology for SMEs", against "rising challenges, including an aging population, global trade shifts, rapid automation, and climate risks".

    Published
    2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19)
    Evidence period
    1986 to 2023
    Geography
    Viet Nam
    Limitations
    A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.

Process

What systems shape the outcome?

Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

The evidence asks What has to be coordinated, by whom, for anything here to work at scale?

Process coordinates speed. Outcomes at this scale depend on institutions, trade systems, industrial coordination, digital rules, disaster systems and regional architecture such as ASEAN working together. The region's distinctive instrument is interoperability: connecting sovereign systems rather than merging them, which is what makes coordination adoptable and also what limits what it can compel.

  • Source ASEAN Single Window (2022)

    About ASEAN Single Window

    The ASEAN Single Window connects the National Single Windows of ASEAN Member States so that trade documents are submitted once and processed once for customs clearance. "The ratification of the Protocol on the Legal Framework to Implement the ASW (PLF) has enabled the live operation of the ASW among ASEAN Member States. In 2021, AMS have exchanged more than 900,000 of the ATIGA e-Form D through ASW." Other documents were being added one at a time: the ASEAN Customs Declaration Document exchange "started since December 2020 among Cambodia, Myanmar, and Singapore", with Malaysia and Thailand joining in 2021 and the Philippines in January 2022.

    Published
    2022 (undated page whose status text stops in 2022, accessed 2026-09-19)
    Evidence period
    2020 to 2022
    Geography
    The ASEAN Member States
    Limitations
    Published by the programme itself, so it reports its own progress. It counts documents exchanged rather than trade outcomes, says nothing about cost to run or about the traders who cannot use it, and its status text stops in 2022, so it is not evidence of current volumes. This record was read on the programme's own website on 2026-09-19. That website has since appeared in search indexes under unrelated gambling titles, so the link now points to ASEAN's official Single Window page on asean.org, which describes the same programme but does not carry the 2021 figure quoted here.
  • Source AHA Centre, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (2026)

    About us

    The AHA Centre is "an intergovernmental organisation, established by the ten ASEAN Member States with the aim to facilitate cooperation and coordination of disaster management amongst ASEAN Member States", created by an agreement signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on November 17, 2011. It works primarily with the National Disaster Management Organisations of the Member States, reports to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management, whose members serve as its Governing Board, and is affirmed as "the primary ASEAN regional coordinating agency on disaster management and emergency response" by the One ASEAN One Response declaration and ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management.

    Published
    2026 (undated page, accessed 2026-09-19)
    Evidence period
    2011 to 2026
    Geography
    The ASEAN Member States
    Limitations
    The Centre's own account of its mandate, not an evaluation of how it performed in any particular emergency. The page is internally inconsistent about membership, referring to both ten and eleven Member States, and it carries no publication date.
  • Source Energy Market Authority, Singapore (2024)

    Singapore Doubles Power Import Capacity Under LTMS-PIP Phase 2

    "Phase Two of the LTMS-PIP will see electricity traded increase from up to 100 megawatts (MW) to a maximum of 200 MW. This is made possible by the introduction of multidirectional power trade under which additional supply will come from Malaysia." The project "was launched on 23 June 2022 and marked the first collaboration among four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states on multilateral cross-border electricity trading of renewable energy." The regulator's chief executive describes the enhancement as bringing the region "closer to achieving the vision of the ASEAN Power Grid", which is therefore not presented as achieved.

    Published
    2024-09-20
    Evidence period
    June 2022 to 2026
    Geography
    Lao PDR, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore
    Limitations
    A media release from one participating government's regulator, announcing a licence extension. It reports traded capacity rather than delivered energy, and says nothing about price, utilisation, or the rest of the ASEAN Power Grid's planned interconnections.

Planet

What must endure?

Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

The evidence asks What physical limits decide what is actually possible here?

Planet exposes limits. Energy demand, grids and storage, disaster risk, climate exposure, urbanization, critical minerals and resource intensity set the boundary inside which industrial and technological ambition has to fit. These are not a separate environmental agenda: they are the conditions that determine whether the production and urban systems the region has built can keep operating.

  • Source Energy Market Authority, Singapore (2024)

    Singapore Doubles Power Import Capacity Under LTMS-PIP Phase 2

    "Phase Two of the LTMS-PIP will see electricity traded increase from up to 100 megawatts (MW) to a maximum of 200 MW. This is made possible by the introduction of multidirectional power trade under which additional supply will come from Malaysia." The project "was launched on 23 June 2022 and marked the first collaboration among four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states on multilateral cross-border electricity trading of renewable energy." The regulator's chief executive describes the enhancement as bringing the region "closer to achieving the vision of the ASEAN Power Grid", which is therefore not presented as achieved.

    Published
    2024-09-20
    Evidence period
    June 2022 to 2026
    Geography
    Lao PDR, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore
    Limitations
    A media release from one participating government's regulator, announcing a licence extension. It reports traded capacity rather than delivered energy, and says nothing about price, utilisation, or the rest of the ASEAN Power Grid's planned interconnections.
  • Source U.S. Geological Survey (2026)

    Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Nickel

    Indonesia mined 2,310,000 tons of nickel in 2024 and an estimated 2,600,000 tons in 2025, against world totals of 3,710,000 and an estimated 3,900,000 tons: roughly 62 percent of world mine production rising to roughly 67 percent, on reserves of 62,000,000 tons. Over the same period, "Production in Australia decreased by an estimated 54% after multiple companies placed mines into care-and-maintenance status owing to low prices", and in the Philippines production "declined by an estimated 24% after multiple mines reported production cuts".

    Published
    2026-02
    Evidence period
    2024, with 2025 estimated
    Geography
    World, reported by country of mine production
    Limitations
    Mine production and reserves only. It does not cover smelting, refining, downstream investment or who owns the capacity, the 2025 figures are estimates, and it reports quantities rather than the environmental, labour or revenue effects of where the mining happens.
  • Source AHA Centre, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (2026)

    About us

    The AHA Centre is "an intergovernmental organisation, established by the ten ASEAN Member States with the aim to facilitate cooperation and coordination of disaster management amongst ASEAN Member States", created by an agreement signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on November 17, 2011. It works primarily with the National Disaster Management Organisations of the Member States, reports to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management, whose members serve as its Governing Board, and is affirmed as "the primary ASEAN regional coordinating agency on disaster management and emergency response" by the One ASEAN One Response declaration and ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management.

    Published
    2026 (undated page, accessed 2026-09-19)
    Evidence period
    2011 to 2026
    Geography
    The ASEAN Member States
    Limitations
    The Centre's own account of its mandate, not an evaluation of how it performed in any particular emergency. The page is internally inconsistent about membership, referring to both ten and eleven Member States, and it carries no publication date.

Portfolio

What must leaders choose?

Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

The evidence asks What successful system must leaders start changing while it still works?

Portfolio chooses what must change before failure forces it. Every leadership team here holds a mix of systems that are delivering, systems that are ageing, and systems that are already past their design conditions. The judgement is which to renew now, at a cost, rather than later, at a crisis, and success does not guarantee future fitness.

  • Source World Bank (2026)

    Viet Nam Overview

    Reforms since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986 "helped transform Viet Nam from one of the world's poorest countries to a dynamic middle-income economy", with GDP per capita rising "from under $700 (1986) to nearly $4,500 (2023)" and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent, making it "one of the world's most open, trade-oriented economies". Reaching high-income status by 2045 requires it to "accelerate productivity, strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms, expand access to finance and technology for SMEs", against "rising challenges, including an aging population, global trade shifts, rapid automation, and climate risks".

    Published
    2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19)
    Evidence period
    1986 to 2023
    Geography
    Viet Nam
    Limitations
    A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.
  • Source U.S. Geological Survey (2026)

    Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Nickel

    Indonesia mined 2,310,000 tons of nickel in 2024 and an estimated 2,600,000 tons in 2025, against world totals of 3,710,000 and an estimated 3,900,000 tons: roughly 62 percent of world mine production rising to roughly 67 percent, on reserves of 62,000,000 tons. Over the same period, "Production in Australia decreased by an estimated 54% after multiple companies placed mines into care-and-maintenance status owing to low prices", and in the Philippines production "declined by an estimated 24% after multiple mines reported production cuts".

    Published
    2026-02
    Evidence period
    2024, with 2025 estimated
    Geography
    World, reported by country of mine production
    Limitations
    Mine production and reserves only. It does not cover smelting, refining, downstream investment or who owns the capacity, the 2025 figures are estimates, and it reports quantities rather than the environmental, labour or revenue effects of where the mining happens.

How the 4P Leadership Lens works

SDG connections Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

Which Goals does this touch?

A Goal appears here only when a cited source supports the link.

  • SDG 7
    Affordable and clean energy Primary

    7.1: Ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services

    Affordability and reliability are the constraint the transition has to satisfy, not a footnote to it. Evidence-backed

    • Source Energy Market Authority, Singapore (2024)

      Singapore Doubles Power Import Capacity Under LTMS-PIP Phase 2

      "Phase Two of the LTMS-PIP will see electricity traded increase from up to 100 megawatts (MW) to a maximum of 200 MW. This is made possible by the introduction of multidirectional power trade under which additional supply will come from Malaysia." The project "was launched on 23 June 2022 and marked the first collaboration among four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states on multilateral cross-border electricity trading of renewable energy." The regulator's chief executive describes the enhancement as bringing the region "closer to achieving the vision of the ASEAN Power Grid", which is therefore not presented as achieved.

      Published
      2024-09-20
      Evidence period
      June 2022 to 2026
      Geography
      Lao PDR, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore
      Limitations
      A media release from one participating government's regulator, announcing a licence extension. It reports traded capacity rather than delivered energy, and says nothing about price, utilisation, or the rest of the ASEAN Power Grid's planned interconnections.
    • Source International Energy Agency (IEA) (2024)

      Southeast Asia Energy Outlook 2024 (World Energy Outlook Special Report)

      "At the end of 2023, Southeast Asia had 106 GW solar PV module manufacturing capacity", and Viet Nam, Thailand and Malaysia were the world's largest solar PV manufacturers after China. Clean energy drew around USD 32 billion of just over USD 70 billion in energy investment in 2023, only 2 per cent of global clean energy spending. In Viet Nam, "the renewable deployment boom was not matched with increased investment in transmission", which "led to curtailment and a slowdown of new investment".

      Published
      2024-10
      Evidence period
      End of 2023, with scenario projections to 2035 and 2050
      Geography
      The ten ASEAN member states in 2024
      Limitations
      IEA analysis drawing on commercial data inputs. Manufacturing figures are capacity, not production, and the plants are largely owned by Chinese companies. Its 2024 investment figure is described as an estimate, and all figures after 2024 are scenario projections. It gives no measured curtailment volume for any country.
    • Source International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (2026)

      IRENASTAT: Electricity capacity statistics (2026 H1 dataset)

      Installed on-grid renewable capacity at the end of 2025 was about 50,604 MW in Viet Nam, 15,632 MW in Thailand, 10,343 MW in the Philippines, 10,398 MW in Indonesia and 9,746 MW in Malaysia.

      Published
      2026 (queried from IRENASTAT on 2026-09-21)
      Evidence period
      End of 2025
      Geography
      Viet Nam, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, each separately
      Limitations
      Installed capacity, not electricity generated or delivered, capacity factors or curtailment. Malaysia's 2025 values are identical to 2024 and may be carried forward. IRENA's capacity accounting differs from IEA modelling, so the two sets of figures should not be combined.
  • SDG 8
    Decent work and economic growth Primary

    8.2: Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation

    Productivity and upgrading are what hold the region's position once cost advantage alone stops working. Evidence-backed

    • Source World Bank (2026)

      Viet Nam Overview

      Reforms since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986 "helped transform Viet Nam from one of the world's poorest countries to a dynamic middle-income economy", with GDP per capita rising "from under $700 (1986) to nearly $4,500 (2023)" and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent, making it "one of the world's most open, trade-oriented economies". Reaching high-income status by 2045 requires it to "accelerate productivity, strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms, expand access to finance and technology for SMEs", against "rising challenges, including an aging population, global trade shifts, rapid automation, and climate risks".

      Published
      2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      1986 to 2023
      Geography
      Viet Nam
      Limitations
      A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.
    • Source World Bank (2026)

      Industrial Policy in the Digital Age: East Asia and Pacific Economic Update, April 2026 (overview)

      "Only about 13-17 percent of multinational enterprise subsidiaries in China and Thailand use AI, compared to 37 percent in the United States, and AI adoption is heavily concentrated among multinationals, with domestic firms lagging well behind", with diffusion limited by gaps in connectivity, skills and startup ecosystems.

      Published
      2026-04
      Evidence period
      Recent years to 2026
      Geography
      Developing East Asia and Pacific, with named comparisons for China, Thailand and the United States
      Limitations
      The report states that "assessing the true pace of adoption is complicated by the absence of a universal or consistent measure of AI use". The adoption figures cover multinational subsidiaries in two economies, not all firms, and some of its AI-use mapping draws on company data rather than official statistics. Only the overview was read.
  • SDG 9
    Industry, innovation and infrastructure Primary

    9.2: Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and raise industry's share of employment and GDP

    Industrial renewal, infrastructure and the diffusion of technology into ordinary firms are the region's central economic question. Evidence-backed

    • Source World Bank (2026)

      Viet Nam Overview

      Reforms since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986 "helped transform Viet Nam from one of the world's poorest countries to a dynamic middle-income economy", with GDP per capita rising "from under $700 (1986) to nearly $4,500 (2023)" and a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 170 percent, making it "one of the world's most open, trade-oriented economies". Reaching high-income status by 2045 requires it to "accelerate productivity, strengthen linkages between domestic and foreign firms, expand access to finance and technology for SMEs", against "rising challenges, including an aging population, global trade shifts, rapid automation, and climate risks".

      Published
      2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      1986 to 2023
      Geography
      Viet Nam
      Limitations
      A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.
    • Source Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) (2024)

      The Digital Divide Amongst MSMEs in ASEAN (ERIA Research Project Report 2024 No. 20)

      "In Malaysia, large and medium-sized companies averaged 20 digital tools compared with less than five amongst small or micro firms"; microenterprises have the lowest adoption rates for every tool; adoption of advanced tools including AI, IoT and robotics is "still widely low"; and only 5.6 per cent of surveyed firms received advice on suitable solutions from the public sector, against 29.4 per cent from the private sector.

      Published
      2024-09
      Evidence period
      Survey fieldwork March to July 2023
      Geography
      ASEAN: a web survey in all ten then-member states and a phone survey in Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam
      Limitations
      Self-reported survey data from 2023, before generative AI spread widely. Comparability across economies is only partial: the web panel does not match official statistics, some sample segments were filled from others, headline country comparisons rest on the three phone-survey countries, and it is not a representative national estimate for any country. The report's conclusion says both surveys covered all ten member states, which contradicts its own sampling table. It measures adoption, not productivity or causal effect.
    • Source World Bank (2026)

      Industrial Policy in the Digital Age: East Asia and Pacific Economic Update, April 2026 (overview)

      "Only about 13-17 percent of multinational enterprise subsidiaries in China and Thailand use AI, compared to 37 percent in the United States, and AI adoption is heavily concentrated among multinationals, with domestic firms lagging well behind", with diffusion limited by gaps in connectivity, skills and startup ecosystems.

      Published
      2026-04
      Evidence period
      Recent years to 2026
      Geography
      Developing East Asia and Pacific, with named comparisons for China, Thailand and the United States
      Limitations
      The report states that "assessing the true pace of adoption is complicated by the absence of a universal or consistent measure of AI use". The adoption figures cover multinational subsidiaries in two economies, not all firms, and some of its AI-use mapping draws on company data rather than official statistics. Only the overview was read.
    • Source World Bank (2024)

      World Development Indicators: Manufacturing, value added (current US$)

      Manufacturing value added in 2024 was about USD 4.65 trillion in China, USD 788 billion in Japan and USD 499 billion in the Republic of Korea, in current US dollars.

      Published
      2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-21)
      Evidence period
      2024
      Geography
      China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, each separately
      Limitations
      Nominal US dollars, so exchange rates move the figures heavily: Japan's fall from about USD 1.03 trillion in 2021 to USD 788 billion in 2024 largely reflects the yen, not necessarily output. A measure of scale, not of productivity, technology intensity or automation, and not a growth trend.
  • SDG 11
    Sustainable cities and communities Primary

    11.5: Significantly reduce the number of people affected by disasters

    Urbanization and recurring disaster exposure meet in the same coastal and riverine cities. Evidence-backed

    • Source AHA Centre, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (2026)

      About us

      The AHA Centre is "an intergovernmental organisation, established by the ten ASEAN Member States with the aim to facilitate cooperation and coordination of disaster management amongst ASEAN Member States", created by an agreement signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on November 17, 2011. It works primarily with the National Disaster Management Organisations of the Member States, reports to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management, whose members serve as its Governing Board, and is affirmed as "the primary ASEAN regional coordinating agency on disaster management and emergency response" by the One ASEAN One Response declaration and ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management.

      Published
      2026 (undated page, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      2011 to 2026
      Geography
      The ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      The Centre's own account of its mandate, not an evaluation of how it performed in any particular emergency. The page is internally inconsistent about membership, referring to both ten and eleven Member States, and it carries no publication date.
  • SDG 12
    Responsible consumption and production Primary

    12.2: Achieve the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources

    Critical minerals, resource intensity and the costs of processing sit at the centre of the region's industrial strategy. Evidence-backed

    • Source U.S. Geological Survey (2026)

      Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Nickel

      Indonesia mined 2,310,000 tons of nickel in 2024 and an estimated 2,600,000 tons in 2025, against world totals of 3,710,000 and an estimated 3,900,000 tons: roughly 62 percent of world mine production rising to roughly 67 percent, on reserves of 62,000,000 tons. Over the same period, "Production in Australia decreased by an estimated 54% after multiple companies placed mines into care-and-maintenance status owing to low prices", and in the Philippines production "declined by an estimated 24% after multiple mines reported production cuts".

      Published
      2026-02
      Evidence period
      2024, with 2025 estimated
      Geography
      World, reported by country of mine production
      Limitations
      Mine production and reserves only. It does not cover smelting, refining, downstream investment or who owns the capacity, the 2025 figures are estimates, and it reports quantities rather than the environmental, labour or revenue effects of where the mining happens.
  • SDG 13
    Climate action Primary

    13.1: Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters

    Climate exposure and the industrial transition are the same problem here, on the same timetable. Evidence-backed

    • Source AHA Centre, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (2026)

      About us

      The AHA Centre is "an intergovernmental organisation, established by the ten ASEAN Member States with the aim to facilitate cooperation and coordination of disaster management amongst ASEAN Member States", created by an agreement signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on November 17, 2011. It works primarily with the National Disaster Management Organisations of the Member States, reports to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management, whose members serve as its Governing Board, and is affirmed as "the primary ASEAN regional coordinating agency on disaster management and emergency response" by the One ASEAN One Response declaration and ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management.

      Published
      2026 (undated page, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      2011 to 2026
      Geography
      The ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      The Centre's own account of its mandate, not an evaluation of how it performed in any particular emergency. The page is internally inconsistent about membership, referring to both ten and eleven Member States, and it carries no publication date.
    • Source International Energy Agency (IEA) (2024)

      Southeast Asia Energy Outlook 2024 (World Energy Outlook Special Report)

      "At the end of 2023, Southeast Asia had 106 GW solar PV module manufacturing capacity", and Viet Nam, Thailand and Malaysia were the world's largest solar PV manufacturers after China. Clean energy drew around USD 32 billion of just over USD 70 billion in energy investment in 2023, only 2 per cent of global clean energy spending. In Viet Nam, "the renewable deployment boom was not matched with increased investment in transmission", which "led to curtailment and a slowdown of new investment".

      Published
      2024-10
      Evidence period
      End of 2023, with scenario projections to 2035 and 2050
      Geography
      The ten ASEAN member states in 2024
      Limitations
      IEA analysis drawing on commercial data inputs. Manufacturing figures are capacity, not production, and the plants are largely owned by Chinese companies. Its 2024 investment figure is described as an estimate, and all figures after 2024 are scenario projections. It gives no measured curtailment volume for any country.
View the 5 supporting Goals
  • SDG 4
    Quality education Supporting

    4.4: Substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship

    Whether technological adoption produces broad value depends on skills reaching the workforce that uses it. Evidence-backed

    • Source Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) (2024)

      The Digital Divide Amongst MSMEs in ASEAN (ERIA Research Project Report 2024 No. 20)

      "In Malaysia, large and medium-sized companies averaged 20 digital tools compared with less than five amongst small or micro firms"; microenterprises have the lowest adoption rates for every tool; adoption of advanced tools including AI, IoT and robotics is "still widely low"; and only 5.6 per cent of surveyed firms received advice on suitable solutions from the public sector, against 29.4 per cent from the private sector.

      Published
      2024-09
      Evidence period
      Survey fieldwork March to July 2023
      Geography
      ASEAN: a web survey in all ten then-member states and a phone survey in Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam
      Limitations
      Self-reported survey data from 2023, before generative AI spread widely. Comparability across economies is only partial: the web panel does not match official statistics, some sample segments were filled from others, headline country comparisons rest on the three phone-survey countries, and it is not a representative national estimate for any country. The report's conclusion says both surveys covered all ten member states, which contradicts its own sampling table. It measures adoption, not productivity or causal effect.
  • SDG 5
    Gender equality Supporting

    5.4: Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through public services, infrastructure and social protection policies

    Ageing raises care demand, and how care work is recognised decides who can participate in the economy. Evidence-backed

  • SDG 10
    Reduced inequalities Supporting

    10.7: Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people

    Labour moves across the region's borders in large numbers, governed by two systems at once. Evidence-backed

  • SDG 16
    Peace, justice and strong institutions Supporting

    16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels

    Governing acceleration is an accountability problem before it is a technology problem. Evidence-backed

  • SDG 17
    Partnerships for the goals Supporting

    17.14: Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development

    The region's coordination architecture is policy coherence between sovereign states, attempted in practice. Evidence-backed

    • Source ASEAN Single Window (2022)

      About ASEAN Single Window

      The ASEAN Single Window connects the National Single Windows of ASEAN Member States so that trade documents are submitted once and processed once for customs clearance. "The ratification of the Protocol on the Legal Framework to Implement the ASW (PLF) has enabled the live operation of the ASW among ASEAN Member States. In 2021, AMS have exchanged more than 900,000 of the ATIGA e-Form D through ASW." Other documents were being added one at a time: the ASEAN Customs Declaration Document exchange "started since December 2020 among Cambodia, Myanmar, and Singapore", with Malaysia and Thailand joining in 2021 and the Philippines in January 2022.

      Published
      2022 (undated page whose status text stops in 2022, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      2020 to 2022
      Geography
      The ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      Published by the programme itself, so it reports its own progress. It counts documents exchanged rather than trade outcomes, says nothing about cost to run or about the traders who cannot use it, and its status text stops in 2022, so it is not evidence of current volumes. This record was read on the programme's own website on 2026-09-19. That website has since appeared in search indexes under unrelated gambling titles, so the link now points to ASEAN's official Single Window page on asean.org, which describes the same programme but does not carry the 2021 figure quoted here.
    • Source AHA Centre, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (2026)

      About us

      The AHA Centre is "an intergovernmental organisation, established by the ten ASEAN Member States with the aim to facilitate cooperation and coordination of disaster management amongst ASEAN Member States", created by an agreement signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on November 17, 2011. It works primarily with the National Disaster Management Organisations of the Member States, reports to the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management, whose members serve as its Governing Board, and is affirmed as "the primary ASEAN regional coordinating agency on disaster management and emergency response" by the One ASEAN One Response declaration and ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management.

      Published
      2026 (undated page, accessed 2026-09-19)
      Evidence period
      2011 to 2026
      Geography
      The ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      The Centre's own account of its mandate, not an evaluation of how it performed in any particular emergency. The page is internally inconsistent about membership, referring to both ten and eleven Member States, and it carries no publication date.
    • Source ASEAN Secretariat (Chairperson of the ASEAN SEOM, ASEAN Philippines 2026) (2026)

      Statement of the Chairperson of the ASEAN Senior Economic Officials (SEOM) on the Conclusion of ASEAN DEFA Negotiations

      ASEAN SEOM "successfully resolved all outstanding issues in the negotiations of the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA)" in Manila on 27-29 May 2026, marking the conclusion of negotiations on ASEAN's first region-wide digital economy agreement, and "looks forward to the signing of the ASEAN DEFA in November 2026".

      Published
      2026-05-30
      Evidence period
      Negotiations concluded at the Second Meeting of the 57th ASEAN SEOM, Manila, 27-29 May 2026
      Geography
      ASEAN Member States
      Limitations
      An official statement announcing that negotiations concluded. Concluding negotiations is not signature, ratification, entry into force or implementation, and the statement itself says signing is expected in November 2026. Its projection that the digital economy could double to USD 2 trillion by 2030 is conditional and attributed to studies it does not name. It establishes no outcome of any kind.
Why these Goals, and why these are primary

Primary Goals carry the region's inquiry; supporting Goals are touched by it. They are not equally weighted. Where a Goal carries no source, its connection is a LEAD48 synthesis traced to the region's conditions rather than a measured link, which is currently the case for Goals 5, 10 and 16. The disaster-management sources on Goals 11 and 13 evidence the region's response architecture, not disaster outcomes in cities or the link between climate exposure and the industrial transition, which remain synthesis.

The movement

What this movement asks

Theme Acceleration, coordination, renewal

Broad window Thu 20 May, about 6:00 PM to 9:00 PM Toronto time. In Singapore: Fri 21 May, about 6:00 AM to 9:00 AM.

Inquiry themes this movement feeds Renewing a system that cannot be switched off. Where you live does not decide where you fit.

LEAD48 curates the conversations inside this movement from the research on this page and the perspectives below. You do not need to choose a session: bring what you know to the inquiry, and the matching is LEAD48's work.

Contributor expressions of interest are not open.

The shape of a movement

How a movement moves

The same beats in every region, in the same order. What fills them, and how long they take, is this region's own.

View the beats every movement runs through
  1. Baton Handover In

    The incoming and outgoing regions are both live. Intellectual content, not an emcee transition.

  2. Opening Regional Provocation

    One strong regional voice frames the movement: what is happening in this region right now, and why should the rest of the world care?

  3. Regional Reality

    The evidence: what is actually true in this region.

  4. Responses, Experiments and Tensions

    The practical core: what is being tried, and where it is contested.

  5. Regional Synthesis

    What we learned, what challenged our assumptions and where we disagreed.

  6. Baton Question + Handover Out

    The signature moment. The baton never simply moves: it evolves.

Perspectives sought Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

What perspectives strengthen this inquiry?

The kinds of knowledge and experience this inquiry needs. They describe perspectives, not places: one person may bring several, and a strong case or a well-evidenced challenge counts as much as a title.

View the knowledge this movement needs
  • East Asian industrial and productivity expertise

    Knowledge required Works on industrial productivity, advanced manufacturing or innovation systems in Northeast Asia.

    Why this is needed Renewing a model that still works is this subregion's live problem, and it is understood best from inside it.

  • ASEAN regional integration

    Knowledge required Has negotiated or implemented regional agreements between ASEAN member states.

    Why this is needed Interoperability without political unification is the region's distinctive instrument, and its limits are known by the people who use it.

  • Manufacturing and global value chains

    Knowledge required Works inside global production networks, at firm or policy level.

    Why this is needed Whether upgrading reaches beyond the exporting firms is decided in these networks.

  • AI deployment and governance

    Knowledge required Deploys or governs AI systems in production, not only in research.

    Why this is needed The region's value comes from diffusion and governance rather than from frontier capability.

  • Demographic and ageing expertise

    Knowledge required Works on ageing, fertility, pensions or the economics of contracting workforces.

    Why this is needed Demographic divergence rewrites the assumptions every other priority is built on.

  • Youth and workforce entry from a younger Southeast Asian economy

    Knowledge required Is entering work or leadership in an economy with a young and growing population.

    Why this is needed The entry-level work that automation changes is where this generation joins the economy.

  • Energy security

    Knowledge required Is responsible for keeping power affordable and reliable at national or utility scale.

    Why this is needed Transition proposals meet this constraint first, and it is not negotiable for the people who carry it.

  • Clean energy and grids

    Knowledge required Builds or operates renewable generation, storage or grid infrastructure.

    Why this is needed Generation without grid and storage produces announcements rather than delivered power.

  • Critical minerals and industrial transition

    Knowledge required Works in mining, processing or the industrial policy around critical minerals.

    Why this is needed The region's most contested industrial strategy needs practitioners who can hold its benefits and its costs at once.

  • Disaster resilience

    Knowledge required Prepares for and responds to recurring disasters operationally.

    Why this is needed Coordinated response is a standing capability here, and it is tested in practice rather than in doctrine.

  • Digital interoperability

    Knowledge required Has built cross-border digital, customs, payment or identity systems.

    Why this is needed Connecting sovereign systems is the technical form of the region's political question.

  • Small and medium enterprise productivity

    Knowledge required Works with the smaller firms where most of the region's employment sits.

    Why this is needed Technology that reaches only frontier firms does not raise a country's incomes.

  • Labour and workforce transformation

    Knowledge required Represents or works with workers through industrial and technological change.

    Why this is needed Workforce adaptation is the mechanism of renewal, and it is experienced before it is measured.

  • Urban systems

    Knowledge required Plans or runs the systems of a large, fast-changing city in the region.

    Why this is needed Urbanization, energy, mobility and disaster exposure converge in these cities first.

  • Supply-chain resilience

    Knowledge required Designs or manages supply chains through disruption and reconfiguration.

    Why this is needed Efficiency and resilience trade against each other in these decisions, concretely and with numbers attached.

The baton

The question moves

  1. It arrives. Australia & Pacific hands this movement the question.
  2. This region changes it. Everything above is what it is changed by.
  3. It leaves changed. South Asia receives whatever this movement earns in the room.

No question is written in advance. Each movement's question is earned live, in the room, and published here once it has been.

Global report contribution

What this movement will contribute

How this movement feeds the report

What this movement will contribute to the LEAD48 Global Leadership Report 2027. Every field is filled from the live movement, and disagreement is preserved rather than resolved. When a locked synthesis is changed by what the movement shows, the pre-event version is kept.

What this movement finds is written in the room during the relay and becomes its part of the LEAD48 Global Leadership Report 2027. How the five outputs work

Research gaps and limitations Evidence-grounded synthesisLocked for the programme

What this evidence cannot show

These are limitations, not blockers. They are published so a reader can judge the evidence for themselves.

View what this evidence cannot show
  • Four response cases carry no verified figures

    The digital economy framework agreement, Singapore's AI governance frameworks, Korea's workforce and pension reform and Southeast Asian clean-energy manufacturing are described from the locked research without a primary-source figure attached. They say so rather than asserting numbers.

    Affects: Responses and experiments

  • An agreement is not an outcome

    Several regional instruments here are documented as agreed or launched rather than as delivered. The cases distinguish the two: the power grid case is classified on what has actually been traded, and the digital framework claims no outcomes at all.

    Affects: Responses and experiments

  • Northeast Asia is the least sourced part of the brief

    The verified evidence attached here is strongest on ASEAN coordination and on Southeast Asian economies. The largest Northeast Asian economies are differentiated in the architecture, and no primary source of their own is attached to them in this cycle.

    Affects: Inside the region, Responses and experiments

  • Regional disaster coordination is documented by its own mandate

    The AHA Centre case rests on the Centre's description of what it is for. No independent evaluation of how it performed in a specific emergency is attached, so the case establishes standing capability rather than measured effectiveness.

    Affects: Responses and experiments

  • The nickel case reports quantities, not consequences

    The verified source covers mine production and reserves. The environmental, community, energy and revenue-sharing questions the case raises are named as unresolved rather than evidenced here, and the case is classified contested for that reason.

    Affects: Responses and experiments, Planet

Research and evidence

See the evidence

Every claim on this page links here. Participants' contributions do not statistically represent the whole region.

View all 30 sources
  1. Viet Nam Overview

    World Bank · 2026 (living country page with no publication date, accessed 2026-09-19) · Evidence period: 1986 to 2023 · Geography: Viet Nam

    Population: The national economy

    Limitations: A summary page rather than a study: no methodology of its own, no publication date, and figures that run to 2023. It states a development trajectory and a set of institutional challenges; it does not evaluate any particular policy, and one country's path is not the region's.

  2. Industrial Policy in the Digital Age: East Asia and Pacific Economic Update, April 2026 (overview)

    World Bank · 2026-04 · Evidence period: Recent years to 2026 · Geography: Developing East Asia and Pacific, with named comparisons for China, Thailand and the United States

    Population: AI use by multinational enterprise subsidiaries; task content of jobs

    Limitations: The report states that "assessing the true pace of adoption is complicated by the absence of a universal or consistent measure of AI use". The adoption figures cover multinational subsidiaries in two economies, not all firms, and some of its AI-use mapping draws on company data rather than official statistics. Only the overview was read.

  3. The Digital Divide Amongst MSMEs in ASEAN (ERIA Research Project Report 2024 No. 20)

    Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) · 2024-09 · Evidence period: Survey fieldwork March to July 2023 · Geography: ASEAN: a web survey in all ten then-member states and a phone survey in Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam

    Population: Self-reported adoption of 24 digital tools by firms, 6,048 web and 3,099 phone responses

    Limitations: Self-reported survey data from 2023, before generative AI spread widely. Comparability across economies is only partial: the web panel does not match official statistics, some sample segments were filled from others, headline country comparisons rest on the three phone-survey countries, and it is not a representative national estimate for any country. The report's conclusion says both surveys covered all ten member states, which contradicts its own sampling table. It measures adoption, not productivity or causal effect.

  4. World Population Prospects 2024: Summary of Results (advance unedited version)

    United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division · 2024-07-11 · Evidence period: Estimates to 2024; projections from 2025 · Geography: World, with named countries

    Population: Total population trajectories and total fertility rates

    Limitations: Figures for 2024 are estimates and later figures are projections. The key-findings list naming countries whose populations have peaked does not name the Republic of Korea explicitly, and the Philippines is not named as growing through 2054. It measures total population and fertility, not working-age population, labour-force participation or care demand.

  5. Population Estimates, August 2026 report (Jinko Suikei)

    Statistics Bureau of Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications · 2026-08-20 · Evidence period: Final estimates as at 1 March 2026; provisional as at 1 August 2026 · Geography: Japan

    Population: Total population, population aged 15 to 64, and population aged 65 and over

    Limitations: Monthly population estimates based on the 2020 Census, to be revised once the 2025 Census counts are released; the August figures are provisional. They measure population by age, not labour-force participation, care demand or productivity.

  6. Preliminary Results of Birth and Death Statistics in 2025

    Ministry of Data and Statistics, Republic of Korea (formerly Statistics Korea) · 2026-02-25 · Evidence period: 2023 to 2025; 2025 preliminary · Geography: Republic of Korea

    Population: Live births, deaths and the total fertility rate

    Limitations: Preliminary figures for 2025. It measures births, deaths and fertility, not the age structure, working-age population, labour-force participation or care demand, and a one-year rise in fertility is not a reversal of the trend.

  7. Statistical Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2025 National Economic and Social Development

    National Bureau of Statistics of China · 2026-02-28 · Evidence period: End of 2025 · Geography: China

    Population: Year-end total population and its age structure

    Limitations: National statistics using a working-age band of 16 to 59 rather than the 15 to 64 used elsewhere, so working-age shares are not directly comparable with Japan's or Korea's. It measures population and age structure, not labour-force participation or care demand.

  8. Timor-Leste Population and Housing Census 2022: Main Report

    National Institute of Statistics Timor-Leste (INETL) · 2023-05 · Evidence period: Census 2022, with growth measured from 2015 · Geography: Timor-Leste

    Population: The enumerated population by age

    Limitations: A census count, not a projection. One country's age structure, published by the national statistics institute and hosted by UNFPA; it does not measure employment, the productivity of work, or labour-force participation.

  9. Singapore Doubles Power Import Capacity Under LTMS-PIP Phase 2

    Energy Market Authority, Singapore · 2024-09-20 · Evidence period: June 2022 to 2026 · Geography: Lao PDR, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore

    Population: Cross-border electricity trade between four ASEAN member states

    Limitations: A media release from one participating government's regulator, announcing a licence extension. It reports traded capacity rather than delivered energy, and says nothing about price, utilisation, or the rest of the ASEAN Power Grid's planned interconnections.

  10. Southeast Asia Energy Outlook 2024 (World Energy Outlook Special Report)

    International Energy Agency (IEA) · 2024-10 · Evidence period: End of 2023, with scenario projections to 2035 and 2050 · Geography: The ten ASEAN member states in 2024

    Population: Clean-energy manufacturing capacity, energy investment and power-system conditions

    Limitations: IEA analysis drawing on commercial data inputs. Manufacturing figures are capacity, not production, and the plants are largely owned by Chinese companies. Its 2024 investment figure is described as an estimate, and all figures after 2024 are scenario projections. It gives no measured curtailment volume for any country.

  11. Integrating Solar and Wind in Southeast Asia

    International Energy Agency (IEA) · 2025-09 · Evidence period: 2019 to 2025 · Geography: Southeast Asia, with country detail for Viet Nam, Thailand and Indonesia

    Population: Variable renewable generation and the power systems integrating it

    Limitations: Qualitative on curtailment: it names curtailment and grid congestion as consequences but reports no measured curtailment volume or rate for any country.

  12. About ASEAN Single Window

    ASEAN Single Window · 2022 (undated page whose status text stops in 2022, accessed 2026-09-19) · Evidence period: 2020 to 2022 · Geography: The ASEAN Member States

    Population: Traders and customs authorities exchanging electronic trade documents across borders

    Limitations: Published by the programme itself, so it reports its own progress. It counts documents exchanged rather than trade outcomes, says nothing about cost to run or about the traders who cannot use it, and its status text stops in 2022, so it is not evidence of current volumes. This record was read on the programme's own website on 2026-09-19. That website has since appeared in search indexes under unrelated gambling titles, so the link now points to ASEAN's official Single Window page on asean.org, which describes the same programme but does not carry the 2021 figure quoted here.

  13. Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Nickel

    U.S. Geological Survey · 2026-02 · Evidence period: 2024, with 2025 estimated · Geography: World, reported by country of mine production

    Population: Nickel mine production and reserves

    Limitations: Mine production and reserves only. It does not cover smelting, refining, downstream investment or who owns the capacity, the 2025 figures are estimates, and it reports quantities rather than the environmental, labour or revenue effects of where the mining happens.

  14. DS592: Indonesia, Measures Relating to Raw Materials

    World Trade Organization · 2022-11-30 (panel report circulated) · Evidence period: Consultations requested November 2019 to appeal notified December 2022 · Geography: Indonesia

    Population: Indonesia's export prohibition and domestic processing requirement for nickel ore

    Limitations: A dispute record. It establishes the measures and the panel's legal finding; Indonesia appealed into an Appellate Body that is not operating, so the finding is not final. It establishes nothing about value captured by domestic processing, who owns the processing capacity, revenue, processing energy, or labour, environmental or community effects.

  15. About us

    AHA Centre, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management · 2026 (undated page, accessed 2026-09-19) · Evidence period: 2011 to 2026 · Geography: The ASEAN Member States

    Population: National disaster management organisations and the populations they serve

    Limitations: The Centre's own account of its mandate, not an evaluation of how it performed in any particular emergency. The page is internally inconsistent about membership, referring to both ten and eleven Member States, and it carries no publication date.

  16. IRENASTAT: Electricity capacity statistics (2026 H1 dataset)

    International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) · 2026 (queried from IRENASTAT on 2026-09-21) · Evidence period: End of 2025 · Geography: Viet Nam, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, each separately

    Population: Installed on-grid renewable generating capacity, in megawatts

    Limitations: Installed capacity, not electricity generated or delivered, capacity factors or curtailment. Malaysia's 2025 values are identical to 2024 and may be carried forward. IRENA's capacity accounting differs from IEA modelling, so the two sets of figures should not be combined.

  17. World Development Indicators: Manufacturing, value added (current US$)

    World Bank · 2024 (series values for 2024, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-21) · Evidence period: 2024 · Geography: China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, each separately

    Population: Manufacturing value added in nominal US dollars

    Limitations: Nominal US dollars, so exchange rates move the figures heavily: Japan's fall from about USD 1.03 trillion in 2021 to USD 788 billion in 2024 largely reflects the yen, not necessarily output. A measure of scale, not of productivity, technology intensity or automation, and not a growth trend.

  18. Statement of the Chairperson of the ASEAN Senior Economic Officials (SEOM) on the Conclusion of ASEAN DEFA Negotiations

    ASEAN Secretariat (Chairperson of the ASEAN SEOM, ASEAN Philippines 2026) · 2026-05-30 · Evidence period: Negotiations concluded at the Second Meeting of the 57th ASEAN SEOM, Manila, 27-29 May 2026 · Geography: ASEAN Member States

    Population: The negotiated text of the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement

    Limitations: An official statement announcing that negotiations concluded. Concluding negotiations is not signature, ratification, entry into force or implementation, and the statement itself says signing is expected in November 2026. Its projection that the digital economy could double to USD 2 trillion by 2030 is conditional and attributed to studies it does not name. It establishes no outcome of any kind.

  19. ASEAN Fully Implement e-Form D through the ASEAN Single Window

    ASEAN Secretariat · 2024-01-01 · Evidence period: From 1 January 2024 · Geography: ASEAN Member States

    Population: Issuance and acceptance of the ATIGA e-Form D certificate of origin

    Limitations: An announcement of full implementation. It reports no volumes, and establishes nothing about trade growth, clearance times, costs, or which traders can use the system.

  20. Joint Communique of the 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting

    ASEAN Secretariat · 2026-07-21 · Evidence period: Position as at 21 July 2026 · Geography: ASEAN Member States

    Population: ASEAN foreign ministers' collective position

    Limitations: A negotiated communique. On DEFA it records that text negotiations have concluded and that signing is still ahead; it establishes nothing about implementation or effect.

  21. What is AI Verify

    AI Verify Foundation · 2026 (undated page, read 2026-09-21) · Evidence period: May 2022 to May 2025 · Geography: Singapore

    Population: A voluntary AI governance testing framework and toolkit

    Limitations: A description of a tool by the body that maintains it. It establishes what the framework is and when it was released, not how many organisations use it, what testing found, or any effect on how AI systems behave.

  22. Project Moonshot

    AI Verify Foundation · 2026 (undated page, read 2026-09-21) · Evidence period: Tool as described in 2026 · Geography: Singapore

    Population: An open-source LLM evaluation tool

    Limitations: A tool description. It establishes that the tool exists and what it is for, not its use, findings or effect.

  23. Testing Real-World Generative AI Systems: Global AI Assurance Pilot main report

    AI Verify Foundation, with its parent the Infocomm Media Development Authority of Singapore (IMDA) · 2025 (no date stated in the report; file published in June 2025) · Evidence period: Pilot launched February 2025 · Geography: Singapore, with participating organisations from eight other geographies

    Population: 17 generative AI applications from self-selected deployers, tested by specialist AI testing firms

    Limitations: A practitioner report on a voluntary pilot of 17 self-selected applications. It reports lessons about how to test, not measured safety or effectiveness of the applications, and not how widely such testing is used. Participation is not adoption, and one high-capacity jurisdiction's pilot is not evidence about AI governance across Southeast Asia.

  24. Bijih Nikel Tidak Boleh Diekspor Lagi per Januari 2020 (Nickel ore may no longer be exported from January 2020)

    Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Republic of Indonesia (ESDM), press release 549.Pers/04/SJI/2019 · 2019-09-02 · Evidence period: Announced 2019; effective 1 January 2020 · Geography: Indonesia

    Population: Exports of nickel ore below 1.7 per cent grade

    Limitations: An announcement of a future ban, not evidence of how it was enforced or what it achieved. It establishes nothing about downstream investment, value capture, ownership, revenue sharing or effects on communities or producers elsewhere.

  25. The AHA Centre Annual Report 2024

    AHA Centre, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management · 2025 · Evidence period: 2024 · Geography: ASEAN Member States

    Population: The Centre's own activity and outputs in 2024

    Limitations: Self-reported by the Centre. It counts activity and outputs, such as responders trained and relief deployed, not outcomes: it reports no response times and no count of people the Centre's assistance reached, and its figure of more than 5 million people affected counts people affected by the disasters, not people helped. It is not an independent or comparative evaluation.

  26. Chairman's Statement of the 47th ASEAN Summit

    ASEAN Secretariat (ASEAN Malaysia 2025) · 2025-10-26 · Evidence period: 47th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 2025 · Geography: ASEAN Member States

    Population: ASEAN membership

    Limitations: A chairman's statement. It establishes Timor-Leste's admission as a member; it also records that Timor-Leste still has roadmap criteria to implement, and it says nothing about any ASEAN body's performance.

  27. '연금개혁법안' 국회 통과, 내년 시행 (Pension reform bill passes the National Assembly, in force next year)

    Ministry of Health and Welfare and Ministry of Economy and Finance, Republic of Korea (Korea.kr policy briefing) · 2025-03-20 · Evidence period: Legislated 20 March 2025; in force from 1 January 2026; contribution path to 2033 · Geography: Republic of Korea

    Population: National Pension Scheme contribution and replacement rates

    Limitations: The government's own account of legislation. It establishes what was legislated, not its effect. An automatic adjustment mechanism was not legislated and was deferred to the National Assembly's special committee on structural reform, and no change to the pension age or the retirement age was made. Its projection that fund depletion moves from 2056 to 2071 depends on fund returns also rising by one percentage point.

  28. Pensions at a Glance 2025: Korea country note

    OECD · 2025-11 · Evidence period: Rules in force after the 2025 reform; projections to the 2060s · Geography: Republic of Korea

    Population: The public pension scheme's parameters and fund projections

    Limitations: An independent international summary. Its fund projections are projections, on assumptions that differ from the Korean government's, which is why the two give different depletion years.

  29. Global Innovation Index 2025: GII 2025 results

    World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) · 2025 · Evidence period: Rankings mainly reflect data from 2023 to 2025 · Geography: Economy-level ranks, including China, Japan and the Republic of Korea separately

    Population: A composite index of innovation inputs and outputs

    Limitations: A composite index built from many indicators. It ranks innovation capacity and outputs; it does not measure manufacturing output, automation, productivity or whether innovation reaches ordinary firms, and WIPO cautions that ranks are not directly comparable across years.

  30. World Development Indicators: Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)

    World Bank, from UNESCO Institute for Statistics data · 2023 (series values for 2023, read from the World Bank data API on 2026-09-21) · Evidence period: 2022 and 2023 · Geography: China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, each separately

    Population: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a share of GDP

    Limitations: An input measure: spending, not innovation outcomes, productivity or diffusion. UNESCO figures can differ slightly from OECD MSTI figures for the same economies, so the two should not be mixed. 2023 is the latest year available for all three.